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Introduction
The afternoon of August 30, 1945 was a bright blue, sunny day with wisps of clouds at
Atsugi Air Base when General Douglas MacArthur stepped from his C-54, Bataan, wearing his
trademark Filipino field marshal’s cap and wielding his corncob pipe.1 General Robert L.
Eichelberger and the contingent who had arrived earlier greeted MacArthur, who told the
welcome party “Melbourne to Tokyo was a long road, but this looks like the payoff.”2 The
American Occupation of Japan had begun. MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers in Asia (SCAP), knew the task that lay before him and had a list of objectives to achieve
a democratized and demilitarized Japan. During the next six years, he put his full effort into this
work. Yet, MacArthur also had vision to see beyond the objectives he was given and used his
autonomy to make decisions to carry out reforms that he knew were necessary for Japan’s
reconstruction and long term stability. Even though the occupation experienced bumps along the
road, the weather on that typical Japanese summer day foreshadowed the eventual success of
MacArthur’s mission.
At the end of World War II, Japan was militarily and economically devastated;
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were radiated ruins; and the people were on the brink of starvation.
Japan’s situation in 1945 looked very bleak as its people slowly began to rebuild their lives and
move past years of bloody war. Transforming Japan meant replacing a military state focused on
expansion with a parliamentary democracy focused on economic prosperity through innovation,
industry, and peace. The American occupation lasted eight years and by the 1960s the Japanese
economy was well on its ways to becoming the third largest in the world. General Douglas
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MacArthur was the man most responsible for Japan’s reconstruction. The Japanese willingness
to restructure their political system, economy, and society combined with the leadership of
MacArthur and the autonomy he wielded as Supreme Commander, brought the country into a
new era of peaceful prosperity, innovation, industrial strength, and stability.
MacArthur is somewhat of a paradox, on one side he was a brilliant military leader and
able administrator, but on the other he was arrogant and egotistical. One of MacArthur’s
biographers’ notes, “Douglas MacArthur was no George Washington.” He adds MacArthur “was
a great thundering paradox of a man, noble and ignoble, inspiring and outrageous, arrogant and
shy, the best of men and the worst of men, the most protean, most ridiculous and most sublime.”3
Despite his shortcomings he proved the right man for the task of rebuilding Japan. MacArthur
was a student of history and was very aware of his place within it. He had studied the great men
and wanted to be a great man. Nearly a decade after the occupation of Japan MacArthur recalled
his pride in presiding over the “world’s great laboratory for an experiment in the liberation of a
people from totalitarian military rule and for the liberalization of government from within.”4 The
occupation of Japan was his chance to be remembered not only as a military commander, but
also as a peacemaker. The Japanese came to respect and revere MacArthur, who symbolized the
occupation’s mission and principles.
President Harry S. Truman gave General MacArthur command of the occupation of
Japan because the position was considered to be ample reward for a top American commander
for services rendered during the war. His detractors expected MacArthur to fade away into the
background at a semi-important Asian post in the postwar world until his eventual retirement.
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President Truman was certainly MacArthur’s biggest detractor as he very much so disliked the
general and putting him in a Asian post could keep him away from Washington. Europe had
center stage and a Eurocentric view dominated the leadership of the American government and
military.5 Asia was seen as a distant second to European policy as most of the region was
underdeveloped and was of remote strategic interest to the American military. Unfortunately for
MacArthur’s detractors and fortunately for Japan, the United States could not afford to be
completely Eurocentric as the Cold War began and Asia took a central role.
The Cold War changed everything for the occupation of Japan by raising the importance
of Asia in American foreign policy. MacArthur understood the importance of having Japan as an
ally and sought to build the foundation for that alliance through his time there. The position of
Supreme Commander came with a large degree of autonomy and included both the American
military command in Asia and the occupation of Japan. This autonomy allowed MacArthur to go
beyond the objectives he was given. The Potsdam Conference had laid the guidelines for the
occupation, but they were deliberately broad. Politically, the rewriting of the Japanese
Constitution was a landmark achievement; economically, land reform was instrumental in
helping boost the economy and implementing a democratic land system; and socially, the
establishment of democratic ideals reenergized the Japanese people and their tradition-based
culture as they entered the era of the New Japan. Religiously, MacArthur reignited Christian
missions to Japan and under the new freedom of religion clause in the Japanese constitution set
the foundation for the small Japanese Christian church to grow.
Scholars have always been interested in the occupation of Japan as it was one of the first
American attempts in nation building. The historiography focuses on the three main branches of
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the occupation: the political, economic, and social aspects with a small group of scholars
examining the religious changes during the occupation. Within this historiography, two names
are the most recognizable among American scholars: John W. Dower and Michael Schaller.
Dower’s Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II describes the occupation of
Japan and focuses on the transformation that rebuilt the country. Schaller’s The American
Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia discusses Japan’s position in
American diplomacy in the early years of the Cold War.6 A key Japanese scholar, Eiji Takemae
examines in The Allied Occupation of Japan (formerly titled Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation
Of Japan And Its Legacy) the Japanese occupation in detail and explores the reforms that
changed Japan. He also examines the Americans and Japanese who worked inside the occupation
government headquarters.7
During the 1970s the declassification of U.S. documents on the occupation of Japan led
to the outpouring of scholarly research and analysis that continues to this day. Many scholars
turned their attention to the economic rise of Japan and how the nation recovered after the war.
John R. Roberson’s Japan from Shogun to Sony, 1543-1984 examines Japan’s transformation
from feudal state to economic power. It is not surprising that more books were to follow as
additional scholars were interested to know why and how the Japanese economy had become the
third largest in the world. Hugh Cortazzi’s The Japanese Achievement, Deborah J. Milly’s
Poverty, Equality, and Growth: The Politics of Economic Need in Postwar Japan, and Richard J.
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Samuels’ Rich Nation, Strong Army: and National Security and the Technological
Transformation of Japan focus on the economic side of the transformation of postwar Japan.8
While the economic side of Japan was examined, others dissected the political side. The
occupation of Japan had established a democracy that remained stable after the occupation forces
were removed. American and Japanese scholars have explored the constitutional and other
political reforms of the occupation in great detail. In the late 1980s, Robert E. Ward, Yoshikazu
Sakamoto, and Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai’s Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation
investigated the political and governmental transformation of Japan. Again during the 1990s,
scholars also examined the political and governmental structure of Japan that came to symbolize
a success story in the history of American nation-building. A large focus within this specified
area was on the Japanese Constitution such as Shōichi Koseki and Ray A. Moore’s The Birth of
Japan's Postwar Constitution. 9 Japan had been introduced to democratic principles when the
country was open to the world in the nineteenth century, but such ideas did not stick. It would be
only after World War II that democracy would be established and become entrenched.
In recent years, with the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and American attempts to
introduce democracy in those countries’ scholars have turned to the occupation of Japan to
understand its success. Dayna L. Barnes’ Architects of Occupation: American Experts and the
Planning for Postwar Japan reexamines the occupation of Japan with a look to the leaders who
planned it. Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson’s Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New
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University of Hawaii Press, 1987); and Shōichi Koseki, and Ray A. Moore, The Birth of Japan's Postwar
Constitution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

5

Japanese State under MacArthur looks at the Japanese constitution and the role MacArthur had
in the constitutional process. Bowen C. Dees’ The Allied Occupation and Japan's Economic
Miracle: Building the Foundations of Japanese Science and Technology 1945-52 examines not
just the Japanese economic change that transformed the country, but illustrates the change in
focus towards science and technology that became staples of the new Japanese economy.10
Contrary to what his detractors expected or wanted, the occupation of Japan has placed
the name MacArthur securely in the history books. General Douglas MacArthur is the name
most associated with the occupation of Japan and he was well known by the American public as
a war hero. MacArthur biographies examine his life or at least specific parts of it. Such titles
include Russell D. Buhite’s Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in America's East
Asian Policy, James D. Clayton’s The Years of MacArthur, Mark Perry’s The Most Dangerous
Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur, and Arthur Herman’s Douglas MacArthur:
American Warrior. 11 MacArthur was a military man most of his life and as such he had a very
military oriented perspective on things. He saw puzzles and patterns of nations and militaries.
The role MacArthur played in the occupation of Japan is an important one and a role that can
only be explored by understanding the man.
The strong relationship between the United States and Japan since World War II has its
roots in the occupation; the economic success and power of the Japanese economy had its start
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with the occupation and the reforms that came with it; and the Japanese government was
reformed to a parliamentary democracy focused on peace, innovation, and prosperous economics
because of the occupation. Plus, the injection of democratic ideals into Japanese society gave
energy to the New Japan that helped to drive the nation forward into a new age. The
psychological acceptance of the Japanese to their defeat, the leadership of the occupation, the
military-over-civilian administration, and the preparation that went into the occupation of Japan
during the war contributed to the success of the occupation.12 MacArthur will always be
remembered as a key leader in the transformation of Japan and its relationship with the United
States. Without MacArthur the occupation would have looked different and the current
American-Japanese relationship would not be the same.
The occupation of Japan has been well examined and analyzed; therefore this thesis will
not explore the occupation in its entirety. Rather it seeks to explain the reforms that General
MacArthur directed that went beyond the objective guidelines of the Potsdam Declaration that he
received when he became the Supreme Commander. The autonomy that MacArthur wielded was
almost absolute. None of the major directives he initiated were overturned by President Truman
or the Pentagon. Further when the occupation ended the Japanese government did not revert to
its previous way of operating. The Japanese willingness to restructure their political system,
economy, and society combined with the leadership of MacArthur and the autonomy he wielded
as Supreme Commander, brought the country into a new era of peaceful prosperity, innovation,
industrial strength, and stability.
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The process of establishing democracy in Japan occurred through four steps. First, the
Japanese emperor had to be brought down from the godlike throne he had been put upon. The
legend and ritual myth that surrounded the Chrysanthemum throne were deeply ingrained in the
Japanese way of life. Second, and connected to the emperor’s divinity was the issue of separating
Shintoism from the state. Freedom of religion would be declared in the Japanese constitution.
With the emperor’s divinity denied and Shintoism no longer the state religion, the third step in
Japan’s transformation into a democracy was a revised constitution. There was no clear plan on
paper to how this was to be achieved. Certainly, it was figured that Japanese leaders would take a
leading role in the revision of their constitution. Yet, given Japan’s strong traditional and
conservative history, Japanese leaders were not prepared to bring their country into a new
democratic era. Finally, the anti-war clause in the new Japanese Constitution was monumental.
Japan’s renouncement of war, guaranteed in their constitution, would ensure the country never
engaged in a war of aggression again. The rise of a truly democratically independent press tied
the political transformation together. MacArthur proved his caliber in these steps in establishing
a democratic Japan by being able to look beyond the objectives he was given and use the power
he had to achieve his mission.
Japan was utterly devastated by World War II. It had a shattered economy, collapsing
financial system, mass unemployment, ruined cities, atomic radiation, and a broken agricultural
system. The occupation of Japan would help rebuild the Japanese economy with resources and
materials worth billions of dollars. The landmark economic development that MacArthur put
through the Japanese government was land reform. Up to that time, Japan still very much had a
feudal based land system. The SCAP initiated reform turned many Japanese tenants into
independent landowners. Land reform brought democratic ideals to a large portion of the rural
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Japanese population as the new landowners could decide what to do with their own land. While
the road ahead would be hard and the Japanese economy would be slow to recover during the
occupation years, those years would lay the foundation for the economy to grow and develop
over the following decades.
MacArthur envisioned democracy and Christianity together as two great pillars for a
successful modern nation-state. His call for missionaries and Bibles reignited the Japanese
mission field after World War II. Yet, MacArthur did not realize that the Japanese were not in a
spiritual vacuum. Buddhism and Shintoism suffered at the end of war because of the Japanese
surrender and the mood of defeatism that pervaded the Japanese consciousness for a time. Japan
was not Christianized though and the Japanese church would remain small. MacArthur saw
Christianity as a key to helping Japan prosper and thrive. During the occupation Christianity only
experienced a small amount growth. Buddhism and Shintoism remained important to Japanese
culture and social life. Christianity was never forced onto the Japanese as a SCAP policy and the
new education law left out religious education. That said, Christianity became a respected social
ethic and an interesting curiosity for the Japanese.
The occupation of Japan is an example of the right factors being put together that led to
the long-term success of the nation. The Potsdam Declaration provided the plan to guide the
reconstruction effort and MacArthur provided the vision and drive to carry out reforms that were
not specified that needed to be taken to insure success of the occupation. Combined with the
planning and leadership there are four reasons why the occupation succeeded: preservation of
self-respect, noncoercion, social adaptation, and procedural consistency.13 MacArthur worked
through the Japanese government to enact the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration. By doing
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this he allowed the Japanese to keep their self-respect. MacArthur did not force democracy onto
the Japanese. He used a gentle, but firm hand with the Japanese government in reforming their
governmental system. Concerned that the Japanese elites were not yet capable of writing a new
democratic constitution within a reasonable time frame, MacArthur took the initiative to have it
written for them. Rather than just make Japan a republic modeled after the United States,
MacArthur saw the best way was to develop a democracy that reflected Japan. Thus, Japan
became a parliamentary democracy with the emperor in a ceremonial role. MacArthur’s
instrumental initiative on land reform furthered the growth of democratic idealism amongst the
Japanese and also helped to boost the Japanese agricultural sector and the recovering economy.
MacArthur’s crusade to Christianize Japan while not successful in developing a large Japanese
church, did establish Christianity as a respected and studied social ethic in Japan. The Japanese
willingness to restructure their political system, economy, and society combined with the
leadership of MacArthur and the autonomy he wielded as Supreme Commander, brought the
country into a new era of peaceful prosperity, innovation, industrial strength, and stability.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing Japan’s Political System
World War II brought out the worst of human nature amounting to the bloodiest and most
horrific war in history. War propaganda and cultural prejudice had twisted Americans and
Japanese against each other. Even with the war over many Americans remained prejudiced
against the Japanese and thought a hard occupation was what Japan deserved for their
responsibility in going to war with the United States. The New York Times echoed such opinions
when it printed August 19, 1945, “The Allied problem will be to shape a “hard” peace for Japan
that will neutralize her as a threat but not leave her as a perpetual sore spot in the Far East.”1 No
one wanted a repeat of the Versailles Treaty and an angry, vengeful Japan. The question was not
if Japan should be punished, but how it should be punished.
A couple days before President Harry Truman announced to the American public what
the plan for the occupation of Japan entailed, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles of wrote,
“It must be a policy which will teach the Japanese people that war does not pay. It must be a
policy which will create within Japan a basis upon which at least a rudimentary democracy can
be built up.”2 The occupation of Japan needed to be sufficiently long to ensure that the Japanese
learned democracy and would not pose a threat to world peace. Welles continued, “That will be a
policy which implies some years of intelligent, constructive and expensive enterprise on our
part,” and “it is the only policy which spells future security for the American people.”3 Japan had
to be occupied and a considerable occupational force needed to be retained to insure that
American security in the region would be protected.
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President Truman announced on September 22, 1945 the occupation of Japan was, “to
insure Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of
the world.”4 Truman, referencing the Potsdam Declaration, continued “Japan will be completely
disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will
be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life.”5 Japan would never again
pose a threat to world peace. Potsdam Declaration Point 6 stated, “There must be eliminated for
all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan
into embarking on world conquest.”6 Such a venture to remove all militaristic influence from
Japan was a daunting task. The planning for the occupation demanded a well-developed list of
objectives to achieve the first point of the Potsdam Declaration.
Two months later in November, George Gallup investigated the American mood and
thought pattern on the occupation of Japan. His polling group asked Americans “Do you think
we will have to police the Japanese many years, or do you think we can withdraw our troops in a
few years,” and resulted, “Many years needed….64%,” “Few years needed….23%,” and “13%
undecided,” showed that Americans expected a long occupation. Gallup revealed that many
people thought the occupation would last a long time because “We cannot trust the Japs,” “They
have to be entirely reeducated, and this will take a long time,” and “They still don’t know they
are licked; it will take a long occupation to teach them.”7 When asked to give an approximate
time frame for how long the occupation should last Gallup added, “The median average of all
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replies is 10 years. If the answers of only those who have attend college are added, the median
average jumps to 15 years.”8 Most Americans wanted an occupation of Japan that would ensure
that another war would not break out and that would reeducate the Japanese to not wage war
again.
During the war in November 1943, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill began addressing their vision of a postwar Japan at the Cairo Conference
when they decided what to do with the territory Japan had conquered. The Cairo Declaration
stated that “Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or
occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to
the Republic of China.”9 In the summer of 1945, the allied leaders confirmed this goal at the
Potsdam Conference by announcing, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and
Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Skikoku and
such minor islands as we determine.”10 Because of this, Japan would have to engage in trade to
gain the resources it needed and utilize diplomacy.
Following the Cairo Conference, the State Department’s new Postwar Programs
Committee (PWC) and the army’s Civil Affairs Division (CAD) took a leading role in
formulating an occupation plan, specifying the nations to be involved, the program to be
developed, and a method for disposing Japan’s colonies.11 Given the United States’ pivotal role
in the Pacific Theater, it is not surprising that there was a group of military and civilian leaders
who preferred an American occupation. Schaller contends, “In March 1944, members of the
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PWC reported that they favored a nearly exclusive American occupation.”12 The PWC also was
in favor of an occupation military administration working through the Japanese government and
retaining the Emperor if only temporarily to achieve its objectives.13 It also believed that while
the Allied Powers could give advice and stay updated on the occupation. America had earned the
right to be the leader of the occupation since it had done the lion share of the bleeding in the
Pacific Theater.
At the end of 1944, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinus, Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal organized the SWNCC (State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee). The SWNCC took a leading role in formulizing the plans for the
occupation of Japan. Schaller illustrates, “Expanding on earlier reports, it urged exclusive
American rule with no zonal division and utilization of the Japanese government to speed
thorough but nonvindictive demilitarization, democratization, and economic reform.”14 Although
in agreement that Japanese heavy industry used in war production should be dismantled to
prevent Japan from rebuilding militarily, the SWNCC pushed more for economic reform and
keeping Japanese industry to help with the reconstruction. With the death of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt in April 1945, SWNCC presented its report to President Truman, who ultimately
approved of the plan.15 The post-surrender plan for Japan was the Potsdam Declaration finalized
on July 26, 1945.
The Potsdam Declaration laid out the objectives that were to be achieved through the
occupation of Japan. This was the directive that MacArthur followed to achieve a demilitarized,
democratic, and peace-oriented Japan. The six points in the Potsdam Declaration that dealt with
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occupation policy were general in nature. Thus, General MacArthur had room to carry out
decisions and reforms he saw as necessary for the reconstruction and stability of Japan.
MacArthur wrote, “It was clear that the experiment in Japan must go far beyond the primary
purpose of the Allies.”16 While the Potsdam Declaration was clear, it left room for adaptation
and independent action to achieve the objectives.
The occupation of Japan was inevitable to ensure that the country would not again pose a
threat to world order and peace (Point 1 of the Potsdam Declaration). What was not clear was
how the occupation would be organized. Further no time limit was established by the Potsdam
Declaration as Point 7 stated, “Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing
proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated
by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here
setting forth.”17 SWNCC 228 stated, “The effectiveness of governmental reforms in preventing
the resurgence of military control in Japan will depend in a large measure upon the acceptance
by the Japanese people of the entire program.” 18 SWNCC 228 also established a line of authority
for the Supreme Commander. When it came to implementation of necessary reforms the
Supreme Commander, “must take into account the problem of sequence and timing, as well as
measures which might be adopted to prepare the Japanese people to accept the changes, in order
to insure that the reforms are lasting in strengthening representative government in Japan.”19 The
leader chosen to command the occupation would have a tall order to fill and at this point the

16

MacArthur, Reminiscences, 282.
Ibid.
18
SWNCC 228, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946; The Far
East, Volume VIII, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 99.
19
Ibid.
17

15

American government did not know the extent of the damage in Japan or what condition the
Japanese people were in.
Because of MacArthur’s personality, his drive to secure his place in history, and his
outspoken perspective he did not make many friends or admirers. Justin Williams adds,
“MacArthur projects two images, one malign and one godlike. He is loathed by his detractors
and revered by his admirers.”20 President Truman disliked MacArthur passionately, however, for
political reasons and because of MacArthur’s popularity he kept the general around. He wanted
to keep the general in a position that was out of the way, but not appear to be unrewarding to a
war hero. George F. Kennan was another MacArthur detractor who disagreed with many of
MacArthur’s views.21 The key to understanding MacArthur is that he was driven to secure his
place in history. MacArthur had a broad understanding of historical perspective that allowed him
an intuitive sense of world events and while he got a lot wrong he also got a lot right.22
Despite his personal views, President Truman saw the position of Supreme Commander
of the Allied Powers in Asia as a fitting reward for MacArthur’s service in the war, but a station
where MacArthur would fade away. Asia was viewed as an underdeveloped region and not a
focus for postwar rebuilding. MacArthur disagreed and refused to become a footnote in some
history book. He considered Asia a very important region and he would use his energy to achieve
success in Japan. William Sebald, a senior civilian official within SCAP recalled, “it was wise
that MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. No American has
wielded such vast power over a foreign country with the wisdom and restraint of this victorious
general. MacArthur became not only the symbol of the Occupation; to the Japanese people he
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was the Occupation.”23 Williams praises MacArthur’s skill, “a brilliant military leader,” and “he
could also very well be remembered as an illustrious statesman,” because “His performance in
Japan was the true measure of his character and caliber.”24 Japan was a broken country and in a
position to be molded. MacArthur had the strength and will to guide the Japanese leadership
toward the democratization of their country.
Named Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for Asia on August 15, 1945,
MacArthur was in Japan a week later establishing his headquarters in Tokyo and getting to work
on rebuilding the defeated nation.25 The objectives of the Potsdam Declaration were clear to
MacArthur and he would put his energy into the task before him. MacArthur wrote, “My
professional military knowledge was no longer a major factor. I had to be an economist, a
political scientist, an engineer, a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of
sorts.”26 As supreme commander he demonstrated his resolve and determination to see through a
successful occupation and reconstruction of Japan. Despite the destruction caused by the war
John Roberson reports “the imperial government bureaucracy was still intact throughout the
nation.”27 Japanese conservatives and moderates had taken back the government from the
militarists following the surrender.28 Unlike in Germany where the government and bureaucracy
had completely collapsed, MacArthur was able to get to work rebuilding Japan relatively
quickly. Arthur Herman remarks, “MacArthur approached it, as he did everything else, with
supreme confidence rooted in a faith in his own competence.”29 MacArthur did not have to bring
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in many American military officials to run the country. SCAP had an easier time establishing
itself in the early days of the occupation not having to establish a new Japanese government as
well.
The position of Supreme Commander, when it came to governing Japan, came with
considerable power and autonomy from President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Japanese expected that MacArthur would wield complete autonomy and control over the
occupation. MacArthur’s orders from President Truman clearly stated, “The authority of the
Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme
Commander for the Allied powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry
out your mission.”30 Sebald recounted, “Subsequent instructions from Washington, furthermore,
gave General MacArthur ample authority and extensive guidance for the wholesale reforms
carried out by his headquarters.”31 Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower informed,
MacArthur “All recognize that the position, views or recommendations of SCAP on any question
will be for your decision and advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, where appropriate, the War
Department as Executive Agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”32 The autonomy MacArthur
wielded was designed such a way because Japan was on the other side of the world. In case
something happened MacArthur had the power to do whatever he needed to do.
MacArthur certainly cultivated an image of power and command in the image he
portrayed every day. He had a dominating presence which certainly had developed in his time in
the military. James Clayton reveals, in the first few months of the occupation, “to MacArthur’s
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delight and with no small amount of cultivation by his public relations staff, the majority of
Japanese were overawed by SCAP and viewed him as a sovereign with powers ranging from
establishing occupation policy to curing invalids.”33 MacArthur understood the importance of
bringing the Japanese people to his side. Borton remarks, “He instilled confidence and acted with
benevolence.”34 Within the first two years he demonstrated a remarkable ability to carry out the
objectives in the Potsdam Declaration and even initiate his own reforms that he knew were
critical to Japan’s reconstruction.35 Kawai adds, “His viceregal manners were hardly democratic
in spirit, but he did not neglect to give the Japanese as much democracy as they could absorb.”36
Japanese civilians sent thousands of letters to MacArthur’s headquarters, many addressing him
as the new shogun or savior of Japan. “An estimated total of 500,000 letters arrived at his
office.”37 Toshikazu Kase, a Japanese diplomat, described MacArthur in his account to the
Emperor, “In the dark hour of our despair and distress, a bright light is ushered in, in the very
person of General MacArthur.”38
The cultivation of public opinion that MacArthur initiated not only established the power
and influence of SCAP, but was the first step in rebuilding relations between Americans and
Japanese. MacArthur envisioned a place for Japan at the world table and took the steps to make it
an American ally. Herman illustrates, “MacArthur felt no such sense of race superiority. A sense
of cultural superiority, however, was another matter.”39 The Japanese political, economic, and
social institutions were backwards and outdated. MacArthur, through SCAP, would revolutionize
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those institutions and bring Japan truly into the twentieth century. While most American leaders
were looking to Europe as the center to focus military resources, MacArthur saw Asia as a
strategic region to focus military resources and form alliances. Sebald illustrates, “MacArthur
had an unusually broad view of foreign affairs, for a military man, and this characteristic, no
doubt, prevented many problems that otherwise might have arisen.”40 MacArthur set about to
instill democracy, a free enterprise economy, and a more egalitarian society as directed by the
Potsdam Declaration guidelines. There was some resistance from Japanese leaders, though
MacArthur proved he was a skilled statesman. MacArthur wrote, “I had formulated the policies I
intended to follow, implementing them through the Emperor and the machinery of the imperial
government.”41 Jennings stresses, “Skillful manipulation of the media, clever exploitation of
latent class animosities, and the emperor’s acquiescence led to the reforms being embraced with
enthusiasm.”42 MacArthur was not just a military leader, he understood politics, employed
humanitarian efforts, and expressed adamant feelings to show the Japanese he was on their side.
MacArthur was autocratic, vain, and inconsistent, yet he had a crusading spirit and strong
leadership qualities.43
Japan was a devastated nation when the American occupation forces arrived. The
Americans had heard of rumors that some Japanese would resist the surrender. American soldiers
were wary of the Japanese after the bloody and vicious fighting in the Pacific.44 The Japanese
were fearful, wondering what was to become of their country many fearing abuse and rape from
the occupiers.45 Yet at the same time a number of Japanese were relieved by the end of the war

40

Sebald, With MacArthur In Japan, 116.
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 281.
42
Jennings, The Road Ahead, 16.
43
Hugh Cortazzi, The Japanese Achievement, 252.
44
John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, NY: Pantheon
Books, 1993), 12.
45
Cortazzi, The Japanese Achievement, 251.
41

20

and looked forward to what the future held with eager anticipation. Seraphim reveals, “Many
Japanese felt liberated by the end of the war and perceived new personal and societal
opportunities; others feared for their professional and social existence, particularly under the
occupation’s purge orders.”46 “Fujiyama Aiichiro, a business leader who later served as foreign
minister, recalled that “when it was learned that the occupying power would be the U.S …. many
industrialists uncorked their champagne bottles and toasted the coming of a new industrialist
era.”47 The Japanese had resigned themselves to the inevitability of an occupation. What
concerned them was the size and scope that the occupation would take.48 Williams writes, “What
struck them was the image MacArthur projected of an extraordinary man sincerely bent on
hacking out new paths for the good of all peoples.”49 The occupation began with MacArthur
being the dominant image of power and hope.50
The occupation forces arrived in Japan without incident and went about securing the
country. To insure the smooth transition of American troops into Japan “Soldiers were issued
handbooks detailing the rules of engagement with local populations as well as appropriate
responses to administrative dilemmas, the structure of local governance institutions, methods to
disarm local police, and the manner in which civil disturbances should be settled.”51 Such a
gesture to make a good impression with the Japanese reveals SCAP’s intent to understand the
culture and people they were ruling. MacArthur recalled, “I cautioned our troops from the start
that by their conduct our own country would be judged in world opinion, that success or failure

46

Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 36.
John D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan, (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1957), 106–107.
48
Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 15.
49
Williams, Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur, 265.
50
Ibid.
51
Jennings, The Road Ahead, 10.
47

21

of the occupation could well rest upon their poise and self-restraint.”52 The fearful Japanese
could not hide forever and curiosity if nothing else brought them out of hiding. Raymond A.
Higgins remembers, “Before long, the local people realized the victors had not come to punish
them at all,” and “Soon the GIs had enticed out the kids with candy bars and gum, and word
spread of the Americans’ visits to hospitals with food, medicine, and kindness.”53 This scene
against the backdrop of a defeated and broken nation and American memory of the bloody
fighting in the Pacific, was the beginning of healing between two formerly bitter enemies.
Despite the racism and bias between Americans and Japanese and the cultural misunderstandings
between the West and East the occupation was benevolent not vindictive. No country before then
had been occupied by another country with less venom.54
It was the children who broke the tension between the adults and the American soldiers.
The American soldiers intrigued the Japanese children who were amazed that the Americans
were nothing like they had heard. Yoshio Ninomiya a young teenager remembered the
Americans as “very handsome” and “they had long legs and would give us snacks. They were
very kind.” Hidekatsu Nankano recalled, “Their guys were very big, very different from us, and I
was really curious about them. Some of them stayed on the second floor of a traditional Japanese
inn, and when they came to the windows they tossed chocolates to us. I never harbored any anger
toward them, even though we lost the war.” Toyoki Goto who was fourteen, remembers, “when
the Americans came in their jeeps and started giving us gum, that’s when it really sunk in that we
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had lost the war. Seeing them for the first time on our land was when it hit me.”55 Many children
understood that their country had lost the war, yet they did not hate their occupiers.
About a month into the occupation a baseball game became a visible sign that the scars of
war were healing between the Americans and Japanese. Kou Takeda remembered, “a group of
American soldiers came to our school on a friendship visit. It was the first time I saw Americans.
They started to play baseball on our sports field at the school, and it was the first time I saw a
new type of baseball glove. They used their equipment to flatten the ground, so we could play
better. A month later, we had a friendship game between the students and the soldiers, and I
remember thinking, “Why did we have a war with these people?””56 Baseball the national past
time of the United States and an admired sport amongst Japanese youth, brought the two groups
together.
Very quickly the American occupiers and Japanese saw that neither one fit the
stereotypes that the other had come to believe about their enemy. The Americans were not cruel
conquerors and the Japanese were not all fanatics. Dr. George E. Blakeslee noted on his visit to
Japan, “The U.S. soldiers have made an excellent impression and General MacArthur is widely
popular.”57 The Japanese people did not castigate the Americans or blame the emperor for the
destruction and death caused by the war, rather they turned against the militarist leaders.58 The
Americans were in Japan to help rebuild and MacArthur did everything in his power to let them
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know American intentions. Jennings explains MacArthur “sent troops and civil affairs officers
on rounds of motorcycle diplomacy throughout the country to establish security and to explain
U.S. intentions while managing local expectations of the military government.”59 Besides
MacArthur’s commanding presence in the occupation, the countless thousands of interactions
between the American occupational forces and the Japanese added to the growth of the new
American-Japanese friendship. Yukiko Koshiro adds, “it was not difficult for the Japanese to
anticipate at the onset of the Occupation that a new phase of U.S.-Japanese relations would begin
in which the two equal peoples would together set out to build a democratic and cosmopolitan
Japan.”60 The efforts of democratization and Westernization seemed to the Japanese as a return
to the old search for national identity in the connecting of East and West as the American
protégé.61 Kawai concludes, “the countless little demonstrations of spontaneous good will and
kindness on the part of most of the American troops toward the Japanese more than
counterbalanced the relatively few cases of American misconduct, and the Japanese attitude soon
became unmistakably one of gratitude.”62 The postwar U.S.-Japanese relationship was well
established through the best efforts of MacArthur and SCAP and the Japanese children.
MacArthur set out to organize SCAP into an efficient military administration divided into
sections that paralleled the Japanese government. As Supreme Commander of Allied Powers he
was also in charge of Far East Command (also Army Forces Pacific). MacArthur appointed his
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Richard Sutherland to draw up a system that would manage
the occupation of Japan. Sutherland split the Civil Affairs (G-5) section creating SCAP General
Headquarters (GHQ) and the Far East Command (FEC) GHQ. “This established that the nature
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of American control was to be supervisory rather than operational and that economy of personnel
could be realized,” and at the same time “Retaining the government and entrusting it with serious
responsibilities from the outset saved Japanese face.”63 Ultimately, SCAP Headquarters,
“consisted of nine sections (Economic and Scientific, Civil Information and Education, Natural
Resources, Public Health and Welfare, Government, Legal, Civil Communications, Civil
Intelligence, and Statistics and Reports).”64 Both headquarters would be under MacArthur, but
each had distinct and independent purposes. SCAP GHQ would handle the business of nationbuilding, while FEC GHQ would handle military and security matters. This division proved most
adequate as the majority of the military career officers served in FEC, leaving SCAP to be
manned by reserve officers with key civilian backgrounds. Such an organizational setup eased
the tension that was inherent in military autocracy and gave room to the requirements that a
budding democracy demanded.65
MacArthur had the autonomy to dictate occupation policy in line with the Potsdam
Declaration and appoint within his military administration who he wanted. The line that
separates the formulation of policy and the execution of policy were many times blurred by
MacArthur as he deliberated and planned.66 Even though MacArthur’s appointees were all good
friends and officers who had previously served with him, they were competent and qualified for
the offices they led. The upper leadership was Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, heading the
SCAP Government Section, Brigadier General Ken R. Dyke, supervising education, press, and
cultural affairs, Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, overseeing the Counter-Intelligence
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Corps, and Major General William F. Marquat leading the Economic-Scientific Section. Lower
offices were manned by experienced and skilled military and civilian personnel. A shortage of
personnel in some areas, however, allowed the Japanese to monitor and report more on their
own.67 MacArthur, though more conservative, allowed SCAP to be more progressive. He called
his strategy “the great middle course of moderate democracy.”68 During the early reform stage of
the occupation that lasted until early 1947, leaders in Washington encouraged SCAP to deal in a
progressive New Deal way.69 This period 1945-1947 saw the key reforms of the occupation
directed towards the Japanese government. The emperor denying his divinity, the separation of
shrine and state, the revision of the constitution, and the establishment of an independent and
free press.
MacArthur’s first priority was to demilitarize Japan and demobilize its armed forces.
When the American 8th Army secured Japan the demilitarization process was started. Potsdam
Declaration Point 9 stated, “The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall
be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive
lives.”70 At the end of the war MacArthur reported Japan had a combined strength totaling
“6,983,000 troops, consisting of 154 army divisions, 136 brigades, and 20 important naval
units.” MacArthur noted that from this statistic there were, “2,576,000 soldiers” in Japan.71 Since
SCAP worked through the Japanese government, the Japanese Army and Navy Departments
oversaw the demobilization of Japanese troops. The two departments had demobilized 2.2
million on the home islands by December 1, 1945.72 Demobilization of Japanese troops outside
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of the home islands was overseen by the Allies in their respective jurisdictions. 6.5 million
Japanese soldiers had to be repatriated back to Japan.73 The Potsdam Declaration had been
achieved in this one important area. By the time the threat of the Soviet Union was fully realized
and the Cold War started, the demilitarization had been so effective that a remilitarization of
Japan was only possible through creating the Japanese Defense Forces.
U.S. forces removed caches of weapons and ammunition, collected military equipment,
and dismantled heavy industry. The Allies used the dismantled industry as reparations. Cortazzi
reports, “Equipment from 394 Japanese factories, which might be used as reparations for the
countries conquered by the Japanese, was confiscated, and industries indirectly involved in the
machinery of war were controlled and production limited.”74 The demilitarization of Japan went
smoothly and was accomplished by the end of 1945. Unfortunately, the influx of so many
veterans back in Japan caused its own set of problems as unemployment increased and the
already stagnant economy showed no signs of recovery.75
While the general mood of most Americans was to punish the Japanese, and the Potsdam
Declaration was firm in its points, for a document of occupational policy, it was not malevolent
or crushing for the Japanese spirit.76 Only those who had led the country to war would be
punished. Potsdam Declaration Point 10 stated, “We do not intend that the Japanese shall be
enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war
criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.” 77 Strong feelings ran
high for justice against Japanese war crimes and various Allies undertook their own tribunals to
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judge the guilty. In Japan, SCAP led the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE), better known as the Tokyo war crimes trial or Tokyo Tribunal, which oversaw the
trials of twenty-eight Japanese leaders for war crimes.78 General MacArthur’s decision to keep
Emperor Hirohito as a stability piece for the occupation removed the Emperor from the war
criminal list.
While he decided to not try Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal, MacArthur had no
intention of leaving him with much power and viewed the demotion of the emperor from god to
man and making him a ceremonial leader as the first step towards making Japan a democratic
nation. On January 1, 1946, Emperor Hirohito denied his divinity, “We stand by the people and
we wish always to share with them in their moment of joys and sorrows. The ties between us and
our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere
legends and myths. They are not predicate on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and
that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.”79 MacArthur
always intended to bring reform through “implementing them through the Emperor.”80
MacArthur recognized that keeping the Japanese emperor would be beneficial. George Kennan
agreed, “there is no question that the Emperor is most useful. He is obeyed by officials and the
people at large. He manifests sincerity in wishing to aid in the accomplishment of our general
objectives and is seemingly more anxious to be democratic than some of the people around
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him.”81 The Japanese people turned to Emperor Hirohito for guidance and looked to see what he
did and how he interacted with the Americans.
To have removed the Emperor from power completely would have satisfied the thirst for
vengeance from some, yet Hirohito meant too much to the Japanese people and in a time of such
drastic change the people needed a symbol of familiarity. MacArthur recalled, “I believed that if
the Emperor was indicted, and perhaps hanged, as a war criminal, military government would
have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out.”82
MacArthur exercised his power in choosing to build up Emperor Hirohito as the main stabilizing
factor in Japan.83 George Blakeslee reported at the time that many Japanese people “felt strongly
that the institution of the Emperor should be retained, but that it should be modified so that it
would come to be similar to that of the British crown.”84 Unsurprisingly when a Japanese Gallup
Poll asked the Japanese public whether or not they wanted to retain or remove the emperor an
overwhelmingly 92% supported retaining the emperor.85
The Japanese had shown themselves to be willing to reform the Imperial institution of
objectionable characteristics and leaders in Washington recognized that the majority still wanted
to retain the emperor.86 Concerning the Imperial institution, SWNCC 209/1 gave MacArthur the
authority to “not take the initiative in advocating its complete elimination,” because “A
monarchial form of government in Japan, if so modified as to be a peaceful and responsible

81

George Atcheson Jr., The Acting Political Advisor in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman, Tokyo,
January 4, 1946, United States Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, The Far East, (1946),
90-91.
82
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 288.
83
Williams, Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur, 20.
84
Report by Dr. George E. Blakeslee on the Far Eastern Commission’s Trip to Japan, December 26, 1945February 13, 1946, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 165-166.
85
Ibid.
86
SWNCC 209/1 Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor of Japan, Report by the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, The Far East, (1946), United States Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 200.

29

constitutional monarchy, would be consistent with American objectives in Japan.”87 Ultimately,
Article 1 of the new Japanese Constitution would declare, “The Emperor shall be the symbol of
the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with
who resides sovereign power.”88
With the emperor in a ceremonial role and Shintoism no longer the state religion, the
biggest and last step in making Japan a democratic nation was the revision of its constitution.89
Yet, the Potsdam Declaration provided only a generalized roadmap with the key goals to
achieve. Further, SWNCC, “never formulated a consistent policy on rewriting the Japanese
constitution.”90 Polls revealed a growing grass roots democratic movement and a majority of
Japanese favored constitutional revision and selecting a commission to carry out the revisions.91
The second part of Point 10 declared the occupation mission to establish democracy in
Japan, “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of
thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.”92 A system
would be installed to keep the Japanese people from becoming controlled by leaders who could
mislead them again. The Japanese Constitution would exemplify and confirm these points for all
Japanese. SWNCC 228 later clarified key points that the Japanese government should be
reformed, “A government responsible to an electorate based upon wide representative suffrage;”
“An executive branch of government deriving its authority from and responsible to the electorate
or to a fully representative legislative body;” “A legislative body, fully representative of the
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electorate;” and the “Guarantee of fundamental civil rights to Japanese subjects and to all
persons within Japanese jurisdictions.”93 Yet, a plan as to how the constitution was to be revised
was not explained.
Democracy had been introduced to Japan in the nineteenth century with the adoption of
the Meiji Constitution in 1889, giving the Japanese a taste of western ideals. The Meiji
Constitution, though appearing democratic, was not and maintained the Japanese feudal order.
Prewar and wartime Japan constituted a totalitarian state intertwined with a tradition-guided
society. Japanese social tradition was driven by relationships; every situation and interaction that
the Japanese would encounter was based on the decorum of the relationship to the person or
thing in question. The emperor was head of state but also worshipped, surrounded with a rich
ritual tradition that tied into myth and superstition. Traditional Japan was backwards in its
political and social institutions, superstitions and myths distorted and continued to have great
sway over Japanese culture.94 SCAP had a tough job breaking into a such a strong, resistant
culture and society, but the devastation in Japan at the end of the war made its efforts easier.
MacArthur gave the Japanese leaders the opportunity to revise their constitution. The
Japanese government appointed Matsumoto Joji, a distinguished Tokyo legal scholar, in October
1945 to head up the constitutional revision committee with the objective to protect the imperial
institution.95 The document they gave SCAP revealed democratic ideas were still slow to break
into the traditional and conservative mold of the Japanese leadership. MacArthur was
disappointed and described it as “nothing more than a rewording of the old Meiji constitution.”96
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The biggest issue was the wording around the Emperor, who was still kept in a position of
power. The second issue was that the basic rights of the people were not properly guaranteed and
could be overridden by a return to totalitarianism. After reading this draft constitution,
MacArthur and his advisers knew Japanese leaders would have to be more firmly guided in
implementing democratic ideals. Fortunately for them, MacArthur had the will as well as the
respect from the Japanese leaders and people to firmly show them the way into democracy.
The decision to put SCAP’s Government Section in charge of writing a completely new
democratic constitution for Japan arose out of several concerns MacArthur considered would
slow or even stall the occupation’s progress. MacArthur worried about the upcoming Diet
election, procrastination on the part of the Japanese leadership, and possible filibustering in the
Far East Commission.97 The procrastination of the Japanese leadership was not only slowing the
constitutional revision process down, it was risking the Imperial institution. Dower reveals,
“MacArthur was galvanized into action because he believed such an initiative had become
essential to protect the emperor,” because “the government’s ultraconservatism was imperiling
the goal the old guard cherished most.”98 If the constitutional process happened to get drawn out
longer than was necessary, the Imperial institution could very well be discarded.
Another problem dealt with time. Following MacArthur advice, the Japanese government
had revised their voting laws and had called for a general election on April 10, 1946. MacArthur
had expected the revised constitution to be ready by then, yet as the situation stood the Japanese
people would have either voted for the old constitution or one that was basically the same.
Because of delays in getting the constitution completed, MacArthur knew he needed to
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accelerate the process and established a committee of twenty-four members to revise it.99 The
Government Section worked to produce a constitution that would incorporate Japan’s Imperial
Household, while also establishing a democratic system.
The United States had established the Far East Commission and Allied Council to give
the Allies a window into the occupation. The Allied Council was not a problem for MacArthur
since it met in Tokyo and was “under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander (or his
deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander.”100 The Far
Eastern Commission’s purpose was “To review, on the request of any member any directive
issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme
Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission.”101
MacArthur feared that the Soviet Union might holdup the commission’s review of the Japanese
constitutional draft; therefore, he bypassed the Far East Commission. MacArthur’s defense was
that the Far Eastern Commission was a “policy making body with no executive power that it is
not empowered to require prior approval of any action either by the Supreme Commander or the
Japanese Government.”102 While representatives on the commission complained, they had no
real authority over MacArthur and his autonomy remained intact.103
The SCAP constitutional draft was given to the Japanese cabinet on February 13, 1946,
and it shocked the Japanese conservative leadership.104 The new constitution took inspiration
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from several constitutional models, but the American and British systems were dominant. The
Japanese Constitution was ultimately a mix of monarchism, democratic idealism, and
pacifism.105 For example, Article 9 stated, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”106 Article 9 represented a
dramatic switch in Japanese thought. The origin of Article 9 is disputed by American and
Japanese scholars as some argue that the anti-war clause was pushed through by MacArthur’s
personal wish to include it in the constitution, others contend that Charles Kade or Courtney
Whitney were responsible, and some agree with MacArthur that Prime Minister Kijuro
Shidehara proposed the idea in a meeting with the Supreme Commander on January 24, 1946.
Regardless, Article 9 undoubtedly originated in Tokyo rather than Washington and would not
have passed without MacArthur’s support.107
Several drafts would follow but no considerable changes were made, mostly rewording of
particular words and phrases between the English and Japanese translations. MacArthur
announced on March 6, 1946, to the Japanese people “It is with a sense of deep satisfaction that I
am today able to announce a decision of the Emperor and the government of Japan to submit to
the Japanese people a new and enlightened constitution which has my full approval.”108 The new
Japanese Constitution became effective on May 3, 1947, declaring Japan a democratic nation.109
The whole constitutional process had taken just a year and half to complete. MacArthur stated,
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“Not only was I convinced that it was the most moral of ideas, but I knew that it was exactly
what the Allies wanted at that time for Japan.”110
The new Japanese constitution gave the Japanese rights and liberties they either had not
known or that had been restricted. A key foundation of a democratic nation is an independent
and free press. A less examined success MacArthur achieved was the establishment of a free
press in Japan. While Japan had no tradition of freedom of press, its media outlets often had
some leeway. Laws related to the press that were enacted during the Meiji Period to strengthen
control, were not initially strongly enforced. Prior to the rise of military control in Japan in the
1930s, the Japanese press found it preferable and profitable to remain politically neutral.111
Unfortunately, with the laws in place for government control the press was in a potentially
vulnerable position to be manipulated and controlled. Coughlin illustrates this by explaining that
by the 1930s, “a situation ripe for any group in power which wished to take advantage of it.”112
When the Japanese militarists started their rise to power, two factors contributed to their hold on
power through the press: first, the widespread low literacy rates among the Japanese population
and second, newspapers provided the main source of news for the people.113 Because of these
factors, it was easy for the militarists to control what information they allowed the press to share
with the Japanese public.
After Japan surrendered, MacArthur directed one of his first non-military directives to the
Japanese press on September 10, 1945. It ordered the government “to prevent the dissemination
of news, through newspapers, radio broadcasting or other means of publication, which fails to
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adhere to the truth, or which disturbs the public tranquility.” He then threatened, “The Supreme
Commander will suspend any publication or radio station which publishes information that fails
to adhere to the truth or disturbs public tranquility.” MacArthur did guarantee “there shall be an
absolute minimum of restrictions upon freedom of speech.”114 Unfortunately, the press initially
ignored several orders from SCAP to change its approach.115
The Supreme Commander cracked down on September 14: the newspaper Domei was
ordered to stop all oversea broadcasts in English, French, Spanish, and Chinese, but later was
shut down permanently. Coughlin notes, “The next day, the nation’s news leaders were
assembled to be told that a 100 per cent censorship would be effective at once.”116 SCAP was
showing its might, Colonel Donald Hoover, chief of censorship, told the group of assembled
news leaders that MacArthur was displeased with their adherence to the directive and that the
latitude shown in the directive could not be entrusted to them because of their untruthful news.
He explained, “The tone of the colored news you have been presenting to the public gives the
impression that the Supreme Commander has been negotiating with the Japanese government,”
Hoover said, ‘There are no negotiations…the Supreme Commander will dictate orders to the
Japanese government. He will not negotiate with it.”117
This was the first time MacArthur demonstrated that he had complete autonomy and
power as Supreme Commander and that the Japanese would adhere to SCAP directives.
MacArthur showed the Japanese news leaders that the occupation would lead with a steel fist,
language that they understood. MacArthur had started with a very reasonable censor for the press
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until the Japanese press forced his hand. In order to create an independent and democratic press,
the Japanese press had to be censored. The Domei was allowed to continue domestic services,
yet on September 18 the newspaper Asahi was suspended for forty-eight hours for saying the
dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan went against international law and that the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines was like the American occupation in Japan. Next, the newspaper
Nippon Times was suspended for twenty-four hours for not sending their printed editions to be
checked by the censors.118 The road to a free and independent Japanese press was not easy.
Progress was forthcoming though and SCAP was patient and even helped train the
Japanese pressmen in the ways of a democratic press. Given the extent to which the Japanese
press had been controlled by the government and for so long, the transformation was bewildering
for many Japanese newsmen who had to adjust to the new system. Coughlin writes, “What
appeared to the Occupation authorities in the early days as a defiant attitude by a reactionary
press often was honest confusion as to what line the Allies wished the press to follow.”119
Coming from a controlled press without any experience on how to be an independent press,
Japanese newsmen needed training.
Beginning in October 1945, SCAP held a number of conferences with Japanese newsmen
and editors to prepare them. MacArthur laid out a five point program to eliminate government
control and or interest in the press and Japanese newspapers, ending special subsidies for
particular newspapers (this led to the demise of Domei), and that the government allow foreign
news services and provide facilities for them to serve the Japanese press.120 MacArthur stated
this was “to further encourage the liberal tendencies in Japan and establish free access to the
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news sources of the world.”121 This breakdown of the established Japanese press and the creation
of a new, more independent and free one was a big achievement of SCAP and MacArthur.
In the first two months of the American occupation, MacArthur had moved quickly to
establish a blueprint for the Japanese press. The press still struggled with moving past the old
system, reporting on news was irregular and the old arrogance still pervaded the news services,
but the blueprint showed that the Japanese press would be transformed. For example, “Japanese
readers learned for the first time in the newspaper Mainichi on September 20, 1945, the full story
of the 1937 rape of Nanking.”122 The Mainichi asserted that Japanese atrocities at Nanking
ruined efforts of promoting friendly relations with China stating the truth of Nanking had been
suppressed during the war.123 There was still a reluctance to name war criminals as the press was
towing the line of least resistance, as the government’s grip on the press was not yet broken.
Then on October 4, 1945, the “Bill of Rights” directive was issued, and where it
pertained to the press it forbade the government from revoking freedom of thought and speech,
opened up conversation about the Emperor and the government, and lifted restrictions on
information. Coughlin concludes, “The SCAP censorship of the press for nearly three years was
an unfortunate but necessary evil. It often was maladministered, but no permanent harm was
done. There can be no doubt that, even after actual censorship was eliminated, Occupation
attitudes greatly influenced the press.”124 MacArthur created an independent and free press by
censoring the old Japanese press and training them how to be democratic and free to report on
stories that needed to be reported published.
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Nation-building in Japan worked in part because the American occupation did not have to
start from the ground up in reconstructing the country’s political system. Though much of
Japan’s infrastructure was in ruins from American bombing, the imperial political system was
still intact. All that was needed was to reform the system and establish democratic principles
with the Japanese leaders and people. The plan for the occupation of Japan was reasonable and
fair. The American occupation was a turning point for Japan that removed the old rigid imperial
impediments to parliamentary democracy. The new Japanese Constitution delivered democracy
to the Japanese, yet did not immensely change Japan from the outside. The emperor became a
ceremonial head of state, Shintoism remained a dominant force in the lives of many Japanese;
but was no longer the state religion, and the rights of all Japanese were guaranteed. Plus, the antiwar clause in the constitution developed a nation around pacifist ideals that would demonstrate
an incredible growth in the Japanese people. The reformed Japanese press also obtained the tools
to be an independent organization responsible to the Japanese people to keep them rightfully
informed. Japan still kept its culture and many social aspects intact though the nation would
change from the inside through the leaders and people.
The political reconstruction of the Japanese government in making the emperor a symbol,
disenfranchising State Shinto and guaranteeing religious freedom, and the new Japanese
constitution reveal the genius of MacArthur. He set out to revolutionize the Japanese political
institution and he did exactly that. Plus, MacArthur gave the new Japanese political system an
independent, democratic press. MacArthur’s wise leadership laid the foundation for the
American-Japanese friendship and alliance. The Japanese were able to maintain a level of respect
and dignity through showing respect and fealty to the occupations policies. The reforms that
MacArthur initiated pushed Japan toward democracy. MacArthur took the initiative where it
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counted to achieve his goals and fulfill his objectives. The Japanese people’s rebuilding and
restructuring of their political system together with the leadership of MacArthur brought the
country into a new era of peaceful prosperity, innovation, industrial strength, and stability during
the Cold War.
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Chapter Two: The Reconstruction of Japan’s Economy
The destruction of Japan’s infrastructure and the loss of all of the country’s territorial
holdings was devastating to the Japanese economy. The destruction left millions without
adequate shelter and the country was in a desperate food crisis. John Dower states, “Sixty-six
major cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had been heavily bombed, destroying 40
percent of these urban areas overall and rendering around 30 percent of their populations
homeless.”1 The devastation of war overall left fifteen million Japanese homeless as there was a
desperate housing shortage of 4,500,000 buildings.2 Many Japanese left the cities and returned to
family farms to work and for shelter. As the Japanese began to rebuild their nation, the
devastation caused “a loss of idealism and an aimlessness” in Japanese society, “a condition that
would not be overcome until the economic boom in later decades provided a new source of pride
for the Japanese public.”3 Japan faced seemingly insurmountable problems, but a combination of
SCAP initiatives, Japanese internal reforms, changing ideas, and the start of the Cold War placed
Japan on a path towards economic prosperity by the mid-1950s.
Japan’s economy would be rebuilt in the aftermath of the war so that the country could be
prosperous and successful. Potsdam Declaration Point 11 stated, “Japan shall be permitted to
maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations
in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war.”4 The Japanese economy would
be rebuilt along the American competitive, free enterprise system. American anti-trust and antimonopoly legislation would be transplanted to Japan. A SCAP statement to the Japanese
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government explained, “The democratization of Japanese economic institutions to the end that
monopolistic industrial controls be revised through the development of methods which tend to
insure a wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade.”5
Unemployment, high inflation, food shortages, and a war-torn economic infrastructure were all
serious problems facing SCAP. Besides those issues the Japanese economy was short on raw
materials and trade partners. Japan’s aggression had antagonized many countries; therefore, the
wounds of war would need time to heal. The United States became the primary trade partner of
Japan during the occupation working to stimulate the economy and solve the major problems
hindering economic recovery.
MacArthur and his advisers realized early on that reparation payments in the form of
Japan’s industrial material would cripple economic recovery. In the end some industrial material
was shipped abroad as reparation payments, but it was a much smaller amount than originally
planned.6 MacArthur believed “every pound of material so removed is a reduction in the
resources available to support the stabilization program” of the Japanese economy.7 The goal
was not to cripple Japan for the next several decades nor keep the nation dependent on U.S.
money and resources. Robert B. Cochrane of The New York Times pointed out, “The equipment
used in many heavy industries is easily convertible to less warlike uses. The machine tools so
important in war production are equally important in the manufacture of articles urgently needed
for peacetime living. It is important for the Allies to see the Japanese become self-supporting as
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quickly as possible, despite the battering they have received.”8 George Kennan agreed, “the idea
of removing industrial equipment from Japan for shipment to other Far Eastern countries, as
conceived in the reparations schemes discussed to date, is—without overstatement—sheer
nonsense from the practical standpoint and basically inconsistent with the requirements of
Japanese recovery.”9 Japan basically required all that was left of its industry to provide even a
basic living standard.10
The first disaster the American occupying force had to address was the food crisis in
Japan. George Atcheson Jr. summarized the crisis, “In the dire straits of the Japanese people
today, political development depends upon solution of the problems of food, shelter and clothing.
Today political education and experience in the practice of democracy are impeded by the
preoccupation of the people with their economic distress.”11 Donald D. Kennedy reported on
February 26, 1946, “There is general agreement that the food situation in Japan will be extremely
serious in the spring and summer.”12 MacArthur reported in May 1946 to Herbert Hoover,
Chairman of the Famine Emergency Committee, “SCAP is convinced that the mass starvation in
prospect in Japan in the event that adequate imports are not secured will make it impossible to
achieve the major objectives of the occupation.”13 Japan was used to importing 15-20% of its
food to supplement what it could produce on its own, but with foreign trade restricted the
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nation’s devastated agricultural sector was not producing enough food for Japan’s population of
seventy million people. SCAP estimated that the majority of the Japanese would be resigned to
an average 700 calories per day for the period of May through September 1946 if something was
not done to help.14 In mid-1946 MacArthur ordered that over 500,000 tons of rice from the
Australian forces in Japan be released to help the Japanese until the next harvest and offered
more assistance in the coming years.15 MacArthur was fully aware that until the food crisis was
resolved the work of democratization would be impeded as the Japanese people were too busy
just trying to survive.
Besides timely reminders and cajoling, MacArthur and the other American authorities
offered tangible assistance to solve the crisis. MacArthur reminded Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida in March 1947 it was “the responsibility of the Japanese Government to maintain a firm
control over wages and prices and to initiate and maintain a strict rationing program for essential
commodities in short supply so as to insure that such commodities are equitably distributed.”
The crisis would continue MacArthur added, “Unless determined measures are undertaken at
once by the Japanese Government.”16 Corruption and the black market exacerbated the crisis and
often made food only available for exorbitant prices. To help alleviate the crisis and put Japan’s
food supply on sounder footing, the United States provided regular food shipments through
1952. As examples, Japan received $392 million in American food aid in 1948 and $429 million
in 1949. With this money, Japan was able “to increase food imports to 1.7 million tons in 1948
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and to 2.4 million tons in 1949.”17 By 1949 the worst of the food crisis was over, but food
rationing was kept in effect until 1952 when the occupation ended.
The next immediate problem in the Japanese economy was unemployment. The
destruction caused by American bombing to Japanese businesses, factories, and SCAP’s shutdowns of the war-related industries, dealt significant blows to economic opportunities.
Unemployment jumped to double digits, even before two million Japanese servicemen stationed
on the home islands retired from service joined the job market by the end of 1945. Then in 1946,
another six million servicemen came home from abroad. Around three million former
servicemen and jobless urbanites returned to family farms to work, but there were still ten
million unemployed seeking jobs in a shattered and broken economy that gave no signs of
revival and hope of economic opportunity.18 Fortunately, help was on the way, and one source of
employment for the Japanese was the occupation itself.
The occupation helped ease some unemployment as many Japanese were hired as
laborers, carpenters and cooks. Akira Tani recalls, “I worked for two years at the American
military camp, the first six months cleaning up and preparing food. Then I was promoted to
cook.” Tani continues, “My salary was 13,400 yen per month. And I got three full meals free
every day.” He remarks, “The average pay for someone just graduating from high school then
was about 3,500 yen a month.”19 During the food crisis such a job was a luxury. Tani recalls, “I
got this job because I cut the meat the way the Americans liked it. But they still didn’t trust us
completely. There were two of us Japanese cooks, but we were never on the same shift, so we
never worked together. There would always be one American cook working with one Japanese,

17

Ibid.
Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, 89.
19
Tani, Akira, Beppu, Oita Prefecture, Japan, Many 1, 2012, interview, in Porter and Porter, Japanese
Reflections on World War II and the American Occupation, 194.
18

45

never two Japanese together.”20 The benefits of working for the Americans meant food and
money. It also eventually helped the mistrust between the Americans and Japanese to fade.
One of the critical ways that MacArthur wanted to tackle the unemployment problem was
through land reform. Land reform became one of MacArthur’s most instrumental and successful
directives. Because many Japanese were farmers and millions of former soldiers and civilians
moved from devastated cities to the countryside, MacArthur knew that the feudal land system
had to change. The purpose of land reform was to reduce overcrowding and eliminate
unfavorable conditions for tenants. “21 Since the Potsdam Declaration stated nothing about
altering Japan’s feudal land policy, MacArthur used the autonomy he possessed to take the
initiative to institute land reform, seeing it as a necessary step in Japan’s democratic journey.
SCAP issued Directive Rural Land Reform on December 9, 1945, asserting:
“In order that the Imperial Japanese Government shall remove economic obstacles
to the revival and strengthening of the democratic tendencies, establish respect for
the dignity of man, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the
Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression, the Japanese Imperial
Government is directed to take measures to insure that those who till the soil of
Japan shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor.22”
Through land reform MacArthur was able to achieve not only the furtherance of democratic
idealism amongst the Japanese population, he was also able to strengthen the humanity in the
Japanese for respect, dignity, and equality between themselves. The Japanese government
handled the business of purchasing land from landowners and selling it at pre-set prices to
former tenants.23 MacArthur showed his enthusiasm when the Japanese government put the land
reform directive into law, “I have studied with satisfaction the measure for rural land reform
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adopted by the Cabinet” and “it is gratifying that the present government has shown the courage
and determination to strike at the roots of an archaic landlord system… “I am convinced that
these measures which the Cabinet has drafted and approved will finally and surely tear from the
soils of the Japanese countryside the blight of feudal landlordism which has fed on the
unrewarded toil of millions of Japanese farmers.” SCAP estimated that almost two million
Japanese farmers, previously tenants, would be able to purchase their own land. The long-term
effect was Japanese farmers organized thousands of farming cooperatives with the support of the
government to break up the feudal system of land ownership.24
Land reform encouraged the spread of democratic fervor amongst the rural population
and strengthened conservative and moderate support in rural Japan. By addressing this issue
MacArthur removed from the chess board an issue that the communists could have used to
destabilize the nation. When the Japanese government land bill was passed on October 11, 1946,
MacArthur stated, “Japan may be credited with a contribution which should profoundly and
beneficially influence the course of human society” … “those who till the land shall reap the
profit from their toil” … “There can be no firmer foundation for a sound and moderate
democracy and no firmer bulwark against the pressure of any extreme philosophy.”25 Land
reform was completed between the beginning of 1946 and the end of 1948. The government
reallocated two million acres and reduced the amount of rented land from forty-six to ten
percent. Eiji notes, “By the end of the reform, 90 per cent of all land under crops was being
cultivated by independent growers, and the number of landless tenants had declined to a mere 7
per cent of farm producers.”26 With this one reform, Japan had taken a big step in its journey as a
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democratic nation. MacArthur revolutionized the land system by democratizing it and preventing
the issue from becoming a foothold that the communists could use to stir up dissent in the nation.
Just as land ownership concentrated in the hands of a few had been a problem, another
critical issue was the dominance of Japan’s industry by just a few families. SCAP set out to
dissolve these Japanese family-controlled companies, or zaibatsu, to develop the Japanese
economy into a more competitive, free enterprise system. American leaders wanted to transplant
anti-trust, anti-monopoly reform to Japan. Issued on November 6, 1945, SCAP directive
Deconcentration of Economic Power stated, “It is the intention of the Supreme Commander to
dissolve the private industrial, commercial, financial, and agricultural combines in Japan, and to
eliminate undesirable interlocking directorates and undesirable intercorporate security
ownership.”27 The purposes were to bring about a greater distribution of income and means of
production and trade, to encourage the growth of economic institutions that would develop
through peaceful trade, and to provide equal opportunities for companies and individuals to
compete in the market.28
There were four main zaibatsu of particular interest to MacArthur: Mitsubishi, Mitsui,
Sumitomo, and Yasuda. SCAP and the American government wanted to dissolve these four
zaibatsu since they were convinced they had been in league with the militarists. Besides the Big
Four, six other big zaibatsu controlled a large chunk of the Japanese economy. They were Asano,
Furukawa, Nissan, Okura, Nomura, and Nakajima. In 1945 these ten zaibatsu controlled 49% of
mining, machinery, shipbuilding, and chemicals; 50% of banking, 60% of insurance, and 61% of
shipping.29 SCAP turned first to voluntary dissolution, but that did not work very well.
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Mitsubishi resisted; Mitsui and Sumitomo stalled for time; and Yasuda proposed a plan for
limited dissolvement.30 The Yasuda Plan proposed that the holding companies be disbanded and
family members resign from their positions in the large subsidiaries; however, it called for
leaving the subsidiaries and their affiliates and subcontractors intact, which was an important
part of the structure of the zaibatsu.31 Eiji remarks, “The Yasuda Plan was patently self-serving
and full of loopholes, a transparent ‘easy-out’ for the zaibatsu.”32 Despite its shortcomings,
SCAP would ultimately adopt the Yasuda Plan for the dissolution of all the zaibatsu.
Established in 1946 by SCAP, the Holding Company Liquidation Commission oversaw
the process of dissolution of the zaibatsu. SCAP, Eiji concludes, “set out to dispose of the shares
of 83 holding companies. A total of 16 were dissolved, among them all 10 of the major zaibatsu
family companies. Some 26 conglomerates were dismantled and then restructured. Eleven were
reorganized, and the remaining 30 were left intact.”33 After beginning the process of dissolving
the zaibatsu, Washington grew concerned that the Japanese economy was recovering too slowly
and decided that it actually needed the zaibatsu in order to achieve a complete recovery.34 With
the Cold War beginning between the United States and Soviet Union, MacArthur and other
American government officials recognized that the west needed a self-sustaining Japanese
economy that could hold its own and resist the spread of communism. MacArthur received the
word from Washington to pull the plug on the zaibatsu directive in mid-1948.
The Holding Company Liquidation Commission “ultimately designated a mere 18 of the
325 largest non-finance subsidiaries slated for disbanding as ‘excessively concentrated.’ Of the
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18, only 11 were actually divided into smaller firms; four had their stock holdings liquidated,
three had some of their industrial assets dispersed; and, for a period thereafter, Mitsui and
Mitsubishi were prohibited from using their corporate trademarks.”35 The desire to dissolve the
zaibatsu was a democratic policy to fulfill Japan’s economic transformation. Unfortunately, the
American zeal for anti-trust, anti-monopoly reform did not translate to the Japanese, who did not
share the same ideal for unconcentrated, competitive economics. Unlike in America, the
Japanese did not view trusts and monopolies with suspicion nor had a problem with industrial
centralization. It also came down to money since the United States was pumping millions of
dollars into the Japanese economy and was seeing little return for its investment. A true
transformation of the Japanese economy in the direction that American leaders in Washington
wanted would have taken longer than they realized.36 The Cold War took the attention and focus
and the United States needed a stable and prosperous Japan so it could divert its focus and
resources where it needed too.
While the effort to dissolve the zaibatsu was short-lived, it still had a positive impact.
While many of the zaibatsu that were broken up in the early years of the occupation reunited
afterwards, they were neither as strong nor as large as they once had been.37 When the Holding
Company Liquidation Commission forced the sale of shares, many investors, unrelated to the
zaibatsu families, were able to become shareholders. As Japan’s economy eventually grew, the
new investors saw the value of their shares increase and they gained more of a role in the
businesses.38 Furthermore, the development of the labor union and Social Democratic
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movements also placed restraints on the zaibatsu.39 Despite the continued existence of the
zaibatsu, SCAP’s efforts as well as the evolution of Japan’s labor movement helped to
democratize Japan’s economy and push it towards greater prosperity.
As Japan’s economy was rebuilt an important question arose amongst SCAP planners:
what industries should Japan invest in? Japan had been one of the top three textile producers in
the world before the war.40 Additionally, textile plants were easy and cheap to set up. Thus, the
textile industry was reestablished in Japan, but they faced definite limits. Roberson points out,
“textile mills needed semiskilled workers, and Japan had millions of skilled workers.”41 While
important, Japan needed some other industries in addition to textiles. To help jumpstart Japanese
industry SCAP encouraged and stimulated Japanese entrepreneurship. Many small businesses
that would grow into big companies got their start from this drive. One of the first industries to
see growth was the manufacture of cameras. With improvements to the camera made possible by
war-time technology, the Japanese took over the camera market which previously had been
Germany’s domain.42 Japanese cameras would become recognizable across the world from
Casio, Canon, Nikon, Pentax, and Panasonic. While camera manufacturing became a key
industry, Japanese leaders recognized they needed other industries to generate a flourishing
economy.
The success of the camera industry encouraged Japanese industrialists to consider other
products. The key to Japan’s new industries was that they needed to require only a small amount
of raw resources to import while producing a product for export that could return a large profit.
Plus, skilled labor was also an important consideration. For example, Honda Katsu-ichiro started
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putting small motors on bicycles in 1946 and the popularity led to the bike “Dream” in 1949 and
the beginning of Honda Motor Company. Ibuka Masaru who owned an electronics company that
had produced communications equipment during the war started producing “shortwave
transmissions to normal broadcasting frequencies, which was the beginning of Sony.43 Honda
and Ibuka’s efforts, as well as the work of others, led to the development of the modern Japan
that the world knows. Automobiles became a fast growing industry and companies such as
Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, and Nissan became major players in the world market. Japanese
businesses looked to industries that demanded skilled workers, thus automobiles, motorcycles,
communication equipment, and electronics became staples of the new Japanese economy.
Sustainability, economic recovery, and stabilization were themes of Japan’s reconstruction when
considering new industries.
Another critical postwar problem was the degeneration of the Japanese currency that had
caused a complete collapse in purchasing power for the Japanese people. Clayton states, “Raging
inflation further diminished the already meager purchasing power of the masses: the yen dropped
to less than a hundredth of its worth in late 1941, and Bank of Japan notes in circulation rose
from Y4.7 billion in December 1941 to Y28.6 billion in August 1945 and Y50 billion four
months later.”44 The high inflation caused a breakdown in the Japanese social order.
As the yen became basically worthless many Japanese traveled to the countryside to
barter their precious possessions for food supplies or turned to the black market. What could not
be obtained through barter or the black market was gained through force or thievery.45 Professor
Shiroshi Nasu of the Tokyo Imperial University and consultant for SCAP, estimated that Japan
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had “lost one-third of its wealth and from one-third to one half of its total potential income,”
which brought the present income to “less than one-half of the pre-war level.” Nasu remarked
that while “The rural population in Japan, comprising 40% of the population, has a present
standard of living about 65% of the pre-war level; the non-rural, about 35% of its pre-war level;
and the nation as a whole,” were at “about one-half of the pre-war level.”46 Japan desperately
needed financial assistance.
MacArthur issued a directive to help the Japanese government reign in the currency
problem. He explained that the directive had a “series of objectives designed to achieve fiscal,
monetary, price and wage stability in Japan as rapidly as possible, as well as to maximize
production for export.”47 Schaller illustrates, “Although neither the Japanese government nor the
American authorities exercised effective control over the money supply, a shortage of raw
materials and diminished purchasing power depressed production to less than half the 1930-1934
level.”48 The Japanese currency continued to suffer and the crisis increased the danger of
undoing everything that SCAP was working to achieve, so an expert was brought in to advise
SCAP on the financial issues.
The key to solving Japan’s currency crisis was the Dodge Plan, named after Joseph M.
Dodge, a Detroit banker, who was appointed by Washington to advise SCAP. Washington sent
several missions to Japan to study different aspects of the nation from economics to education
when experts were needed to help SCAP. The Dodge Mission arrived in Japan in early 1948 and
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was the second mission to investigate Japanese financial issues. MacArthur disapproved of the
first mission, but accepted Dodge’s recommendations, even though they were not very different.
The Dodge Plan called for fairly draconian actions, but necessary steps. Cortazzi explains,
“These included a demand that the Japanese government should balance the national budget,
should terminate the inflationary loans made by the Reconstruction Finance Bank, should
decrease government intervention in the private economy through subsidies and price controls,
should return foreign trade to private hands and should then establish a realistic exchange rate of
360 yen to the US dollar.”49 SCAP adopted the Dodge Plan in 1948 and while tough medicine, it
helped stabilize the yen and set the Japanese economy on the road to recovery by the early
1950s.
While the Dodge Plan stabilized the currency crisis the deficit in raw materials for the
Japanese economy increased and the diminished purchasing power because of the lack of dollars,
only worsened. Schaller reports, “The American Army financed relief shipments valued from
$350 to $400 million per year,” yet these shipments consisted of necessity goods not raw
materials.50 Such shipments were a godsend to the Japanese and eased the economic depression
on necessity goods, yet economic recovery and sustainability continued to suffer. Clayton points
out, “by the time MacArthur left Japan the United States had provided over $2 billion in relief
and welfare goods and services to Japan.”51 The Japanese economy needed raw materials to
function and without territorial holdings it had to import them. This proved more difficult as
many European countries were not in a condition to export or did not want to trade with Japan.
Asian countries were too poor or again did not want to trade with Japan because the wounds of
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war needed time to heal. Just as the Marshall Plan changed the economies of Western Europe,
the Economic Recovery in Occupied Areas program for Japan emerged as the major solution to
this problem.
The Economic Recovery program developed from growing concerns about the expansion
of communism. Japan’s slow recovery mirrored many of the economic difficulties that drove the
development of the Marshall Plan. More so than most leaders in the Truman administration,
MacArthur feared the expansion of communism into Asia and believed something similar to the
Marshall Plan was needed for Asia. He believed that “an integrated and expanding program of
American aid for Asia” was important not just for Japan but also for other Asian nations to keep
them from falling to the Communist Bloc. Such an aid program would help stabilize the
“political and economic conditions in the Far East” while permitting “the necessary expansion of
trade.” Also, it was necessary that Japan “be increasingly free to conduct its own foreign
commerce and engage in merchant shipping” and “the Japanese government and people will take
the necessary steps in internal policy to accelerate production and maximize exports.”
MacArthur believed that “Japan’s internal economy will be effectively stabilized,” as long as
there would be “a speedy and acceptable solution of the reparations problem” including “no
international trade discrimination against Japan or opposition to her freedom to engage in world
trade.”52 In a conversation with George Kennan in March 1948, MacArthur discussed the
importance of a sustainable Japanese economy as the key to Japan’s prosperity. Kennan noted
MacArthur “agreed with the view that this should be made a primary objective of occupational
policy but did not know what he could do today that he was not already doing to achieve it. The
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problem depended, in the main, on the development of foreign trade.”53 MacArthur pointed out,
“Japanese industry and commerce are not yet sufficient to sustain the Japanese economy,” thus
“a much greater effort must be made to bring about the attainment of a self-supporting Japan
with a reasonable standard of living.”54 Japan did not have much in terms of natural resources,
thus it always had to rely on trade to obtain the raw materials it needed. MacArthur understood
that “Economic facts of Japan’s life dictate that Japan must trade to live and therefore must
finally end up where and with whom she can earn a living.”55 Japan needed access to world trade
to survive, especially the markets of the other democratic countries.56 The United States was in a
prime position to influence and benefit from the growth of Asian economics and also secure the
region against communist aggression. The United States did become the primary trade partner to
Japan and what might have started out as a necessary step in the nation’s recovery developed into
a strong trade partnership.
Japanese exports struggled to compete in world trade and were mostly limited to the
United States and Western Europe. Regulation put in place by the United States, lasting until the
1970s, restricted trade with China. Southeast Asia remained too poor and underdeveloped plus
anti-Japanese to be reliable trade partners in raw materials and exports.57 The dollar gap
continued to grow since Japan’s imports greatly outweighed its exports. Schaller asserts, “The
acute dollar shortage arose from the fact that although Japan exported about 66 percent of its
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foreign sales to Asian nations and colonies, almost 90 percent of its imports came from the
United States.”58 The imbalance in Japanese imports and exports meant that Japan brought in
soft nonconvertible currencies with their exports, but required hard dollars to buy their imports,
thus creating a dollar gap. The Economic Recovery in Occupied Areas program for Japan really
helped to solve the dollar gap.
When the United States decided it needed the emergence of an economically strong Japan
in the Cold War, Japan’s economy took a significant step to recovery. The start of the Korean
War in 1950 proved a tremendous boost for Japanese economy as it decreased the unemployment
rate as its businesses and factories increased output. Japan’s location was key, it served Japan’s
military and defense industries well to supply American forces with what they needed in Korea.
Samuels writes, “Within a month [of the start of the war in June 1950], more than 850
installations, including over 300 aircraft plants were returned by SCAP to Japanese owners and
licensed to produce military products.”59 Japan’s support for the United States and United
Nations forces in the Korean War put in on the path to be politically independent, economically
stable, and contributing to its own defense and that of other free nations of the Pacific.60 In fact,
because of American needs in the Korean and Vietnam War, Japan received approximately $500
million annually over twenty years cementing its recovery.61
The destruction of World War II and the loss of life made the Japanese accept the antiwar clause in their new constitution unconditionally. Except for a Japanese Defense Force and
American military bases providing security, the Japanese were content to focus on economic
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prosperity and growth. Roberson writes, “By October 1950, production in certain industries had
risen to the level of prewar days. By 1955, Japanese production overall was equal to prewar, and
the growth of several new industries was yet to come.”62 Japan’s industrial comeback from
economic disaster in 1945 to only ten years later boasting prewar economic levels is astounding.
Samuels explains, “Weapons sales of 7 million yen in 1952 grew to 15 billion yen in 1954, and
overall the U.S. military spent $140 million in Japan between 1952 and 1954.”63 While the
Japanese would not fight wars, they would be a producer for their American ally. The road to
economic prosperity and success for Japan began in 1950 and it became one of the world’s
strongest economies over the coming decades.64
While the Cold War raged around Japan, the Japanese people with no military-industrial
complex to fund, put their efforts into building a specialized technological commercial economy.
The key to Japanese prosperity would be industries that required small amounts of raw materials
to import, while the finished product would bring in large profits. Within in two decades
Japanese cars were showing up on American and other nations roads. When the camera buzz of
the late twentieth century hit, Japanese cameras dominated the market. Japanese electronics were
put into many products in the decades to come including the new high tech military weapons
produced during the Cold War. Japan accepted U.S. military security and advanced military
technology for its own defense and then turned to building a “technonationalist” nation that
revolved around the manufacture, production, and distribution of technologically advanced
goods.65 Samuels explains, “Indigenization, diffusion, and nurturing of technology define the
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core of Japanese technonationalism.”66 Following the Korean War ceasefire, Japan would spend
the next several decades developing their civilian economy to create a unique technological
economic model.67
The reconstruction of the Japanese economy between 1945 and 1953 laid the foundation
for the economic boom that Japan would experience in the following decades. The devastation
caused by the war led to brand new infrastructure being built for the new industries that would
shape Japan’s economy. MacArthur more or less provided the guiding hand to the reconstruction
process. He saw to it that American aid was delivered to solve the food crisis in the nation and
fill the demand for necessity goods. MacArthur’s most instrumental directive that connected to
the political reorientation of the nation and helped in economic reconstruction was land reform.
Land reform has been a key ingredient to successful democratic nations. MacArthur recognized
that fact and that if Japan was to be successful after the occupation, its feudal based land system
would have to go. The land reform directive brought democracy to rural Japan and stabilized the
political leanings of the rural population. The reform established a strong and organized
agricultural sector.
The dissolution of the zaibatsu, though ultimately minimized, did allow for democratic
economics to slowly filter into the highly centralized zaibatsu system. The decision from
Washington to stop the dissolution of the zaibatsu, reveals that the need for a stable, sustainable,
and recovered Japan was more important than insuring that every detail of democratization was
fulfilled. This demonstrates a key to nation-building that the occupying nation has to be ready to
adjust its policies and objectives if it means the success and stability of the occupied nation. The
major reason for needing to change was the beginning of the Cold War between the United
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States and the Soviet Union. The United States needed a sustainable Japanese economy that
could stand on its own with only limited American aid. The Japanese found sustainable
industries that would become dominant and recognizably Japanese in the decades to come.
Cameras, automobiles, and electronics took the Japanese economy to new heights. As their
economic prosperity grew, the Japanese found a new sense of purpose and drive that revolved
around technological advancements. The restructuring of the Japanese economy together with
the leadership of MacArthur brought the country into a new era of peaceful prosperity,
innovation, industrial strength, and stability.

60

Chapter Three: MacArthur’s Attempt to Bring Christianity to Japan
Douglas MacArthur believed in the great value of democracy and Christianity together.
He viewed them as the two pillars against Communism and totalitarianism. Schaller asserts,
“Christianity often seemed a metaphor for MacArthur’s vision of postwar Asia. His most
important mission, he told James Forrestal, was to secure Asia for Christianity and deny it to
Marxism.”1 The occupation’s primary mission was to firmly establish democratic political and
economic institutions in Japan where before there had been none. Japanese culture and society
experienced the new democratic fervor as the major SCAP reforms spread through society.
MacArthur remarked to George Kennan, “The great significance of this occupation lay in the
fact that it was bringing to the Japanese people two great appreciations which they had never
before possessed and which were destined to revolutionize their thinking, namely democracy and
Christianity.”2 MacArthur took the initiative to further the Christian movement in Japan.
MacArthur recalled, “No phase of the occupation…has left me with a greater sense of personal
satisfaction than my spiritual stewardship.”3
Before MacArthur could initiate the return of Christian missions to Japan, State Shinto
had to be ended. The Potsdam Declaration was clear on the establishment of religious freedom in
the Japanese Constitution. State Shinto was the key to destroying the myth of the emperor’s
divinity, thus before Emperor Hirohito denounced his divine power, the Japanese state was
separated from the Shinto shrine. Separation of church and state (shrine from state) would be
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implemented to bolster religious liberty.4 President Truman stated, “ultra-nationalistic and
militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of
religion.”5 State Shinto was the imperial nationalistic version of Shintoism that embodied service
and duty to the emperor. State Shinto had dominated prewar Japan and had used Buddhism,
Christianity, Confucianism, and Taoism to its own advantage.
The Japanese militarists were very good about giving the impression that religious
freedom existed under their regime, but in actuality they were very successful using Buddhist,
Christian, Confucian, and Taoist doctrine to elevate and affirm their State Shinto propaganda.6
Militarist Japan twisted Shintoism and Buddhism so much into its propaganda that it was
difficult to separate them at the end of the war.7 MacArthur noted, “In their hour of agony, like
all human beings, they turned to their religious faiths to bolster them. But even these failed them
at the crucial moment.”8 Religious freedom would restore Shintoism and Buddhism to their
former doctrines before the militarists had twisted them to their agenda. Christianity would also
be free to restore itself and a new era of Christian missions was opened.
SCAP declared on December 15, 1945 in “the Shinto Directive (Shinto shirei),” the
abolishment of State Shinto and the beginning of a new era of religious freedom for the Japanese
people.9 The directive exclaimed, “The sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control and
dissemination of Shinto by the Japanese national, prefectural, and local governments, or by
public official capacity are prohibited and will cease immediately.”10 The Japanese government
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would no longer support a state religion. Plus, “All propagation and dissemination of militaristic
and ultra-nationalistic ideology in Shinto doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies or observances,
as well as in the doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies, and observances of any other religion,
faith, sect, creed, or philosophy, are prohibited and will cease immediately.”11 The next month
when Emperor Hirohito denied his divinity Shintoism reorganized itself. Shintoism would
continue to have a place in Japanese society, but it was not the state religion anymore. The
Japanese people were free to believe and worship in whatever way they wanted.
With the removal of State Shinto measures were taken to ensure that the Japanese
education system would provide a bulwark against militarism. President Truman stated, “The
authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her
political, economic, and social life.”12 Article 9 of the Japanese Fundamental Law of Education
issued on March 31, 1947, stated, “The attitude of religious tolerance and the position of religion
in social life shall be valued in education,” and “The schools established by the state and local
public bodies shall refrain from religious education or other activities for a specific religion.”13
Education in Japan was reformed to provide a balanced and technical education that would
provide the skills needed for the Japanese to move forward. While the history of religions would
be taught, no specific religion would be taught with the purpose of conversion or suppression of
other religions.
MacArthur was a Christian and had great admiration for its doctrines and also more
importantly its life code. Hessell Tiltman of The Washington Post reported, “It is not just
Christian doctrine (although the Supreme Commander and his family open each day with prayers
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and a reading from the Scriptures), but basic concepts of right and wrong, of clean living, of
kindness to ones neighbors.”14 Similar to a lot of people in his time MacArthur was very private
about his faith. On the other hand MacArthur had no problem steering a conversation towards the
topic of Christianity. In a statement to the press on March 17, 1947, MacArthur declared, “I
believe it [democracy] is man’s greatest idea, except Christianity, and believe it will control the
world and lead us toward a Utopia.”15 In the postwar years MacArthur knew that the next great
struggle was going to be the Communist threat from the Soviet Union. As supreme commander
of the occupation of Japan MacArthur felt it was his responsibility to make sure Japan did not
fall to the Communist Bloc. MacArthur steadfastly believed it was his mission to transform
Japanese culture and society toward a stronger respect for human rights and life including the
dignity of the individual. To achieve this MacArthur wanted to encourage and broaden the
spread of Christianity to the Japanese people.16
The Christianization of Japan is an example of the authority and autonomy MacArthur
wielded in Japan. The Potsdam Declaration was clear in Point 10 that religious freedom would
be established. Beyond that there was nothing proscribed about making Japan a Christian nation.
Neither President Truman nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were MacArthur’s superiors, never
told him to stop what he was doing. As long as religious freedom in all matters was not restricted
between Buddhism, Shintoism, and Christianity with one religion growing at the suppression of
the others, there was no problem. When George Kennan traveled to Japan on a policy-planning
trip for the Department of State, MacArthur talked to him for two hours about the importance of
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building democracy and Christianity in Japan. 17 As long as the objectives of the Potsdam
Declaration were being fulfilled and success could be measured, extra decisions and reforms that
the Supreme Commander carried out were added bonuses.
MacArthur’s goal was to Christianize Japan. In a conference with Lieutenant-Colonel
Donald R. Nugent, Chief of SCAP’s Civil Information and Education (CIE) section,
MacArthur’s perspective on Christianizing Japan is clear. The meeting came about because of a
letter sent in by a Christian missionary who complained that under occupation policy,
“Christianity…must not be favored.” MacArthur showed Nugent an ideal reply “the hope and
belief I entertain that Japan will become Christianized. Every possible effort to that end is being
made.” Nugent awkwardly told MacArthur that the CIE’s Religions Division was not doing its
best effort to Christianize Japan. Nugent’s idea of religious freedom was the same as
Washington’s “a minimum of propagation, restraint, and interference on the part of the
government.”18 MacArthur told Nugent that as long as “no religion or belief was oppressed, the
Occupation had every right to propagate Christianity; that…every assistance should be given in
the propagation of the Christian faith.”19 Nugent updated CIE’s politics to reflect MacArthur’s
message.
The devastation at the end of the war caused a spirit of defeatism amongst the Japanese
people. The propaganda that the militarist Japanese leaders had repeated to the Japanese people
came crashing down at the end of the war. MacArthur observed, “Never in history had a nation
and its people been more completely crushed than were the Japanese at the end of the war,”
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explaining “Their entire faith in the Japanese way of life, cherished as invincible for many
centuries, perished in the agony of their total defeat.”20 As the Japanese struggled to rebuild their
lives and come to terms with their defeat, the aftermath of the war had created an opportunity for
Christianity to influence the nation. The Christian Century exclaimed, “What shall the Japanese
believed in place of the discarded emperor myth?” asking “Has Christianity’s hour struck in
Japan?”21 The Washington Post noted, “Japan today is more fertile ground for Christianity than
ever before in the nation’s history.”22 The democratic groundwork had been done and Japan was
ready for a new era of Christian missions.
The small Japanese Christian community in Japan had suffered as much as the rest of the
Japanese population during the war. Approximately 446 churches were destroyed. The Japanese
Catholics lost their ancient stronghold of Nagasaki in atomic fire. The few missionaries who had
remained in Japan during the war moved from devastated congregation to congregation amongst
the ruins.23 The Japanese MacArthur wrote, “needed spiritual leadership as well as material
administration.”24 MacArthur reignited the Christian mission field in Japan by taking the
initiative to call for Bibles for the Japanese and for missionaries to return to Japan. With the loss
of Shintoism’s and Buddhism’s educational and social support from the government, Christian
institutions became the most funded as American missions heeded the call to Japan.25
MacArthur talked about the importance of Christian missions in Japan’s development to
the press, church leaders, and personally spoke to congregations about the need for missionary
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efforts in Japan.26 MacArthur was the very model of ecumenicism calling both Protestants and
Catholics to Japan.27 He told Archbishop Paolo Marella, the apostolic delegate to Japan that the
furtherment “in every way possible…the revival and extension of Christian influence in Japan”
was the goal of mission work. He wrote to Pope Pius XII assuring him that their “common
struggle” was “to repulse the forces of atheism.”28 MacArthur wrote Dr. Louis D. Newton,
President of the Southern Baptist Convention on December 13, 1946, “Christianity now has an
opportunity without counterpart in the Far East.”29 The letter was later published in the military
newspaper Stars and Stripes and received wide coverage. This statement was in a way
MacArthur’s marching order to rally American churches to support missionary efforts in Japan.
MacArthur believed, “The more missionaries we can bring out here, and the more occupation
troops we can send home, the better.” He declared “if 1,000 missionaries come to Japan, Japan
will be a Christian country.”30 Responding to his message, a total of 2,248 missionaries—1,165
Protestant and 1,083 Catholic—came to Japan to preach the Gospel by the end of April 1950.31
MacArthur put his full energy into promoting the Bible drive through public relations and
advertising its importance to strengthening Japanese democracy. In a letter that he quoted often,
he declared, “It gives me great pleasure to commend the reading of the Bible, God’s immortal
gift...In the Sacred Scriptures you will find the Savior of the world Who is the chief cornerstone
of all liberty, the basis of fair and honest government, and the foundation for a…faith in God
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Whose promises never fail.”32 When MacArthur asked the Pocket Testament League to provide
10,000,000 Bibles to distribute in Japan the League took on the challenge. The League ran a
fundraising campaign for the necessary funds and in the end raised enough to distribute
11,000,000 Bibles in Japan. 33 MacArthur showed his endorsement of such “magnificent and
constructive work” in a letter to Dr. Alfred A. Kunz, Executive Director of the Pocket Testament
League, “a demonstration of practical Christianity is making a vital contribution toward meeting
the heart needs of this people by means of mass meetings with wide distribution of the
Scripture.”34 The response to MacArthur’s call for Bibles to Japan is incredible in the scope and
size of the effort. It was MacArthur’s hope “that the people of America will grasp the
opportunity afforded by a merciful God to Lay the foundation for a true and living faith.”35
MacArthur used the influence and power of SCAP to support Japanese Christians.
MacArthur wrote Japanese officials to secure their cooperation in Japanese Christian activities.
Japanese Christians received special permissions to meet in public schools for religious
meetings.36 William Woodard, chief of SCAP’s Religious Research Branch, remarked “It was
almost unthinkable then that any Japanese would refuse a request made by a person having a
letter signed by the General.” Yet, SCAP was clearly showing favoritism to Christianity and
some Japanese leaders did voice their complaints. Woodward illustrates that “It was not strange,”
that SCAP’s Religious Division “was continually receiving reports and…complaints…that
special favors were being extended to Christians by local officials.37 While special favors did not
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violate the policy MacArthur set for SCAP, the special attention and requests certainly were
overbearing to Japanese officials. A Protestant missionary who returned from Japan in 1947
remarked “the Christian gospel now finds an open door.”38
MacArthur’s efforts on the behalf of Christianity in Japan earned him the respect and
admiration from American religious leaders. Protestant and Catholic leaders were impressed by
MacArthur’s theological and spiritual flair. Dr. Walter Van Kirk, a top official in the Federal
Council of Churches observed, “The clock of destiny has struck for the Christian movement in
Japan. All that has gone before is prologue.”39 A spokesmen for the Catholic missionary effort,
who considered MacArthur “the benefactor of Christendom” remarked, “In deep gratitude I
recall all and everything you have done for Christianity in Japan.”40 Bishop Patrick J. Byrne
noted, “both the Japanese bishops and faithful, and the foreign mission workers without
exception, are unanimous in their conviction that the …’MacArthur policy’ is…the ideal one for
the spread of Christianity.”41 MacArthur embodied the Christian spirit to evangelize Japan and
he was held in high regard in Christian circles in America.
MacArthur was zealous in his encouragement and support of Christianity in Japan and
the officers and soldiers who served under him in SCAP were just as zealous to build
Christianity up in the nation. MacArthur recalled his command as “spiritual to the highest
degree.”42 While this statement is embellishment on MacArthur’s part, officers and soldiers
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under his command certainly contributed to Christian missions to the Japanese. The rules that
MacArthur laid out at the start of the occupation for his command to abide by and understand the
culture they were occupying impacted how the Japanese viewed the Americans. American
missionary Charles W. Inglehart wrote that there was an “extraordinary rapport” that developed
and grew between American military personnel and the Japanese, yet “still more intimate have
been the contacts between Christian G.I.s and officers…with Japanese Christians.”43 Many
American soldiers stole military supplies to assist their Japanese friends and ease the suffering
they saw inflicted on them.44 Woodard, head of SCAP’s Religious Research Branch, noted
“Much of this help tended to focus on Christian churches, orphanages, and social welfare
institutions,” and “especially those belonging to the denominations of the service personnel
giving the aid.”45
Besides the average soldier reaching out to Japanese Christians and helping them in their
everyday needs, the military chaplains with the troops also lent a hand in the evangelizing Japan.
Woodard noted that the chaplains provided “a great deal of direct assistance in evangelistic
work” yet kept to “churches of their respective denominations.” Plus they “constantly” asked the
Religions Division “to secure favorable treatment for Christian work. It was frequently assumed
that this was one of its primary functions.” Woodard was personally asked “If you are not
helping Christian work, what is the purpose of the Division?” In the spring of 1946, Chief of the
Religious and Cultural Resource Division William K. Bunce addressed the chaplains in Japan to
make them stop devoting their effort to the Christian movement, “For members of the
Occupation forces to propagate any religion among the Japanese would be to exercise a privilege
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denied to the Japanese people.” Bunce was referring to government assistance which was strictly
denied in the Japanese Constitution and education laws. Woodard noted that “this admonition
was not too favorably received,” and the chaplains never did fully stop their devotion to the
Christian movement in Japan. MacArthur did give his support of Bunce’s statement in a
memorandum of August 29, 1946, though Woodard explained the problem “was not
solved…Individuals continued to go beyond the prescribe limits.”46 Military chaplains continued
to reach beyond their official capacity to evangelize and give aid to the Christian mission in
Japan.
The military chaplains were able to continue to devote time and effort to the Christian
mission because a large extent of SCAP positions were manned by missionaries. Dr. Charles W.
Inglehart, who served as a missionary to Japan for thirty years, was a SCAP advisor on
education. Russell L. Durgin who had worked in Tokyo before the war as YMCA secretary
worked for the Department of State and SCAP. Some other missionaries who worked for SCAP
were Paul Rusch who worked at St. Paul’s University in Tokyo, William C. Kerr from
Presbyterian church, Glen Bruner from a Methodist church, William Woodard from the
Congregational church, and Boude C. Moore from the Dutch Reformed church.47 The missionary
influence within SCAP contributed to the massive surge of support for the Christian mission in
Japan.
MacArthur always connected the expansion of Christianity in Japan to the growing
strength of democracy. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and MacArthur’s crusade to keep
Japan out of the Communist Bloc, Christianity was “a sure and stable foundation on which to
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build a democratic nation.”48 MacArthur wrote to the Foreign Missions Conference of North
America that “through their teachings…of the immutable principles of Christianity,” the mission
effort had “infused knowledge and understanding of the democratic concept” plus “an
appreciation of the basic tenets which govern our own free way of life.”49 MacArthur told an
admirer, “Our Christian faith has formed the sturdy cornerstone upon which has rested our
national strength.” Echoing a similar tone MacArthur told one Christian minister that
“Democracy and Christianity have much in common, as practice of the former is impossible
without giving faithful service to the fundamental concepts underlying the latter.”50 Democracy
and Christianity were two powerful weapons in the arsenal against Communist totalitarian
atheism.
When Christians were elected to the Japanese government MacArthur saw such progress
as a sure sign that Japan was being converted to Christianity. In 1947, the Japanese Social
Democrats came to power, the new Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama, four member of his cabinet,
and twenty-seven members of the Japanese Diet were Christians.51 MacArthur released this
statement, “For the first time in history, Japan is led by a Christian leader—one who throughout
his life has been a member of the Presbyterian Church. It reflects the complete religious
tolerance which so dominates the Japanese mind and the complete religious freedom which
exists throughout this land.”52 Kagawa had been converted to Christianity when he was young

48

MacArthur to Glover M. Birk, December 21, 1949, SCAP MSS, Box 7; MacArthur to Howard Stamlin,
May 31, 1950, SCAP MSS, Box 5, in Wittner, “MacArthur and the Missionaries.”
49
MacArthur to North American Assembly of the Foreign Missions Conference, September 28, 1948,
MacArthur MSS, Box 9, in Wittner, “MacArthur and the Missionaries.”
50
MacArthur to Roy G. Ross, November 20, 1950, SCAP MSS, Box 14; MacArthur to James F. Boughton,
November 22, 1947, MacArthur MSS, Box 8, in Wittner, “MacArthur and the Missionaries.”
51
Wittner, “MacArthur and the Missionaries,” 94.
52
General MacArthur’s statement concerning the significance of the selection of Mr. Katayama as Prime
Minister of Japan, contained in PRO release, May 24, 1947, Appendix G:4, William P. Woodard, The Allied
Occupation of Japan, 356.

72

and had later given away his aristocratic wealth and moved to a slum in the city of Kobe to help
the poor and destitute. In 1915 he earned his divinity degree from Princeton Theological
Seminary.53 Upon his return to Japan he became “a prominent writer, social worker, poet, labor
organizer, pacifist, and Christian evangelist.”54 The Christian Century stated at the end of the
war that Kawaga was “the greatest living exponent of Christianity in the Orient.”55 Despite this,
Kawaga was not without controversy. In March 1946, Kawaga was appointed to the Japanese
House of Peers. That is where a problem arose. According to a SCAP report, Kawaga was
accused of supporting the “Japanese war effort,” and giving a speech that was “antioccupation.”56 SCAP and overall MacArthur, balanced this understanding with the fact “the
united Protestant evangelistic campaign…is largely built around Dr. Kagawa’s personality,”
decided “It is considered advisable to take a sympathetic attitude towards him. To do other
would…undermine the Protestant evangelistic movement in Japan.”57 With that the issue
decided, Dr. Kawaga took his seat in the House of Peers. MacArthur had an investigation into
the Kagawa allegations dropped.
An important milestone in the Christian mission and Christian education in Japan was the
establishment of the International Christian University. In the fall of 1949, a group of Japanese
educators came together to establish a university grounded in Christian principles.58 The idea
initially came from Dr. Ralph E. Diffendorfer, a Methodist missionary. The Foreign Missions
Conference of North America and the Federal Council of Churches, and fourteen other
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denominational mission boards gave their support.59 The U.S. Education Mission which was in
Japan at that time to help SCAP reform the Japanese educational system also supported the
project.60 The Japan International Christian University Foundation was set up to manage the
fundraising for the project to raise the necessary $15 million. MacArthur was an avid supporter
of the project and in 1948 was asked to be an honorary chairman of the foundation. 61 “This
Christian University is one of the most important things America…can do” for Japan’s success
he told John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in a funds drive.62 Diffendorfer later stated that having
MacArthur’s name attached to the project was “a very great help to us.”63
The International Christian University came into existence on June 15, 1949, at the
Gotemba YMCA Camp. The university was organized to be interdenominational. It purchased its
University campus grounds in Mitika, near Tokyo. In March 1953, the university was recognized
and authorized by the Japanese Ministry of Education as an incorporated educational institute
and the school’s College of Liberal Arts became the first-four year program in the nation.64
American missions expanded on a strong private Christian school tradition in Japan.
American Baptists, who could count several thousand Japanese Baptists, had a massive mission
operation in Japan: a sizeable Japan Opportunity Fund, “which supported twenty-six
missionaries, numerous schools and colleges, rural training centers, theological seminaries and
student centers, and rebuilt many Japanese churches. Next to the Baptists the Catholics also had
unsurprisingly a massive mission in the nation: “As of 1952 Catholics maintained 34 different
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journals, 25 elementary schools, 60 high schools and intermediate schools, 15 junior colleges and
technical schools, Sophia University, Nanzen University, several colleges, and 14 seminaries.”65
The reestablishment of denominational independence amongst the Protestant and
Catholic churches in Japan was a direct result of the end of State Shinto and religious freedom
being fully guaranteed in the Japanese Constitution. In prewar Japan, the Protestant
denominations had been joined together into the Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan (United Church of
Christ in Japan). The Kyodan had been used by the Japanese government to control the
churches.66 With the repeal of the Religious Bodies Law, which the prewar Japanese government
had used to form the Kyodan, many Japanese Protestant denominations had an identity crisis.
Many churches left the Protestant union to reestablish their denominations: the Anglican
Episcopal Church, the Lutheran Church, various Baptist Evangelical and Holiness churches, and
the southern Presbyterian tradition formed the Reformed Church and a number of ReformedPresbyterian churches reorganized as the Church of Christ.67 With this redistribution of Japanese
Christians, “only 67 percent of Protestants (that is, 133,057 of the 199,462 Protestants in Japan)”
remained in the Kyodan.68 This new found identity amongst the Protestant churches was a sign
of independent thought and action amongst Japanese church leaders.
The destruction of the war provided an opportunity for the Japanese church to reclaim its
place in Japanese society be a source of relief and aid to those in need. The church might not
have pulled in many believers, but it touched a lot of lives by responding to the destruction and
suffering around it. In the early postwar years the North American Interboard Committee for
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Christian Work in Japan (IBC) and the Kyodan Council of Cooperation (COC) worked together
to rebuild churches and distribute aid. This collaboration between the two groups also helped the
Nihon Kiristuto Kyodan survive those early postwar years. American churches besides
supporting missionary efforts in Japan also helped raise millions of dollars for churches, schools,
and other religious buildings. By 1951, 242 churches and seventy-two schools had been rebuilt.
During the period of 1949-1950, many churches in America, encouraged by MacArthur, made
Japan the topic of their missionary study.69 The relief work that the Japanese Church did in the
early years of the occupation encouraged many non-believing Japanese to “regard Christianity as
a positive, pacifist, and liberal influence in the nation.”70
In 1948 the reconstitution of the National Christian Council in Japan (NCCJ) was
instrumental in developing relations with foreign missions. The NCCJ established an
organizational structure that the Kyodan was able to use to keep connected to the other Protestant
denominations that had left. The NCCJ represented the mainline churches such as the Kyodan,
the Anglican Episcopal Church, the Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the Baptist
Convention.71 Because of this and with ties to the World Council of Churches (WCC), the NCCJ
was out of favor with the more conservative churches.72 Missionaries who had lived in Japan
before the war established the Fellowship of Christian Missionaries (FCM), while postwar
missionaries who were more conservative established the Japan Evangelical Missionary
Association (JEMA).73 As was soon to be a growing trend, postwar conservative missionaries
soon outnumbered the prewar missionaries and the growth of evangelical churches outpaced the
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mainline denominations. Sherrill points out, “From 1949 to 1953, for example, membership in
the so-called “mainline churches increased by about a 6.5 percent, while the membership in the
new evangelical churches increased by 92.1.”74 The evangelical movement in Japan took the
churches by storm as the evangelical churches became the dominant Christian denominations
within the Japanese church.
The Japanese response to Christianity was one of curiosity and questions. Many thronged
the churches because they wanted to know about this religion from the West.75 A prominent
Japanese Christian stated, “To her rejection of Christianity is ascribable the spiritual bankruptcy
of modern Japan.”76 For missionaries this was the opportunity to show the Japanese the truth of
Christianity, which they had not known since the propaganda of State Shinto. Cochrane for The
Sun recorded, “Christian churches of the Western world, one expert said, now have an
opportunity to show that Western civilization means something more than bombs and
battleships.”77 The aspect of Christianity that appealed most to the Japanese was its social ethic
and it gained much respect in that regard. While the older generations might visit churches to
understand what Christianity was about, they kept to Shintoism and Buddhism.78 Philip Potter
reporting for The Sun noted, “Interest in Christianity is found chiefly among the younger
generation.”79 The spiritual vacuum that MacArthur believed had hit Japanese society did not
exist entirely. The damage caused by State Shinto certainly caused some reflection by the
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Japanese, but Buddhism and Shintoism maintained their strength and influence in Japanese
society. Cochrane explained, “the Japanese national outlook and individual habits of thought are
on a different plane from that of the western nations, whose whole life is permeated by Christian
morality.”80 Christianity was accepted as a social ethic, but the Japanese did not choose it to be
their religion.
In a radio message delivered to Congress on February 24, 1947, MacArthur spoke on the
Christian influence in Japan, “A spontaneous development which offers both encouragement and
inspiration as a measure of the progress of this concept (the superiority of moral force over
physical force) lies in the increasing number of the Japanese people—already estimated at over
two million.”81 The Washington Post reported, “the Christian population is estimate at less than
500,000 by responsible officials, despite Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s statement some time ago to
the effect that there are now two million Christians in Japan.”82 By 1951 Protestants and
Catholics numbered only 233,000 and 157,000 respectively, about 0.5 percent of the population
about the same as when MacArthur came to Japan.83 Postwar Japan had a population of seventy
million people and Buddhism and Shintoism were ingrained stronger than MacArthur or any
other Christian church and missionary leader realized. The Japanese might have been
disillusioned at the end of war towards Shintoism, but it still played a very important role in the
lives many Japanese. Buddhism was also very important to many Japanese and had a larger
membership than Shintoism.
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During the 1950s and 1960s, the Christian boom in Japan faded and the churches
continued to grow, but just at a much slower rate.84 Three categories can explain the slow-down
in the Japanese Church: church, society, and mission.85 Firstly, the Japanese Church faced
internal character decisions not external conditions. An issue that the church had to reconcile was
its wartime responsibilities. The Japanese church had succumbed to the imperialistic propaganda
that fueled Japan’s aggression in the war. Now State Shinto bent every religion and philosophy
to its will during the militarist leadership and the Japanese church lost its true identity. During
the occupation it had rediscover itself. Secondly, the occupation had brought a wealth of
Westernization to Japan and economic reconstruction and later prosperity became a focal point
in the minds of many Japanese. The Church would remain an interesting topic of study and a
good social ethic, “but it seemed irrelevant to Japanese religious sensibilities.”86 Japan began to
secularize after the war, and while religion would still be important to the Japanese, it would no
longer hold the same power that it once had. Finally, MacArthur underestimated the influence
that Christianity had on the Japanese. American church leaders and missionaries also
misunderstood the situation in Japan. Japan’s defeat in the war did not completely destroy the
Japanese faith in either Shintoism or Buddhism. The monumental missionary and Bible drive in
Japan is extremely impressive, but the overall success it had bringing Japanese to the Christian
faith was minimal.
MacArthur’s legacy in the Christian mission to Japan is that he initiated the call for
missionaries to return and asked that Bibles be sent for the Japanese. His efforts to rally support
and give encouragement for the mission work demonstrates the passion he had for the project.
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MacArthur saw democracy and Christianity as intertwined and he believed that by bringing
Japan into Christianity the Japanese would better understand democracy. Yet, the drive to
Christianize Japan was not successful because the Japanese did not choose Christianity. The
Japanese church remained pretty close in size to its prewar membership, less than one percent of
the Japanese population. A lasting monument to MacArthur’s efforts to bring Christianity to the
Japanese people is the International Christian University that continues to dedicate itself to
educating young Japanese students about Christianity. Regardless, MacArthur’s efforts do reflect
the autonomy he possessed as supreme commander and his ability to shape occupation policy.
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Conclusion
The occupation of Japan was a success in reforming a militaristic feudal state into a
democratic nation. The monumental task of nation-building took eight years from 1945 to 1952.
The majority of the reforms were implemented in the first four years of the occupation. The last
four years were insuring the long-term sustainability, recovery, and stability of Japan. Douglas
MacArthur proved to be the right man for the job of Supreme Commander. MacArthur brought
to the position a strength and will to succeed in fulfilling the objectives he was given. The
Potsdam Declaration laid out a clear, yet general guideline for the occupation and this coupled
with the autonomy and power given to MacArthur allowed him the room to maneuver to achieve
his objectives. The Japanese willingness to restructure their political system, economy, and
society combined with the leadership of MacArthur brought the country into a new era of
peaceful prosperity, innovation, industrial strength, and stability.
MacArthur had a sense of destiny and wanted to leave a legacy that would endure in
history. He was driven to not be a footnote in some history book. Further, he did not want to just
be remembered as an American general of World War II. The occupation of Japan secured
MacArthur’s place in history because his name is often synonymous with the occupation.
MacArthur’s decisions over the course of the six years he was Supreme Commander demonstrate
his leadership skills as he sought to rebuild Japan into a democratic nation. MacArthur had a
keen sense of strategy and tactics, which made him a good military leader. Yet, he should also be
remembered as a good statesman because he understood the workings of political mechanisms
and knew how to operate in complex situations. Perhaps his strong sense of strategy and tactics
is what made him so good at leading the occupation.
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The type of occupation that MacArthur implemented was designed to educate and train
the Japanese in the ways of a democratic state. The occupation reflected the firmness of the
Potsdam Declaration when carrying out its objectives, yet no occupation in history has had less
venom towards the nation it occupied. This is surprising since during the war there was large
levels of racism and prejudice. As the Gallup poll reflected at the end of 1945 many Americans
thought that an occupation would take upwards of fifteen years and that the Japanese could still
not be trusted after their surrender.1 MacArthur established a cordial relationship with the
Japanese government that he worked through to reconstruct and reform Japan. He laid the
foundation for the new American-Japanese friendship and alliance. By allowing the Japanese
government to work with SCAP, MacArthur helped preserve the self-respect of the Japanese
people and softened the consequences of their defeat. MacArthur worked at a constant pace to
democratize Japan. MacArthur established respect between SCAP and the Japanese by
preserving the Japanese self-respect, addressed cultural differences with understanding, instituted
SCAP reforms at a constant rate, and avoided coercing the Japanese.2
Three reforms reveal MacArthur’s autonomy and authority that were instrumental in the
reconstruction of Japan’s political institution were the retention of the emperor, constitutional
revision, and the establishment of a democratic press. MacArthur retained the Imperial institution
because he understood how important the emperor was to the Japanese culture. The widespread
destruction of Japanese infrastructure, the food crisis, the monetary crisis, mass unemployment,
and the shock of defeat to the Japanese conscience was a recipe for instability that could have
been manipulated by the Soviet Union. The Japanese needed a constant to their lives and the
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emperor was the key to helping maintain stability in Japan. The Japanese looked to Emperor
Hirohito for guidance in the occupation and did as he did in interacting with the Americans.
The Japanese social relationship tradition played a role in how the Japanese accepted the
American occupation. Japanese society was an intertwining web of relationships for interacting
with others and situations. The Emperor at the top of the social relations ladder led the way for
the people when he delivered his surrender announcement on September 2, 1945, “We command
all Our people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out all
the provisions of the Instruments of Surrender and the General Orders issued by the Japanese
Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters hereunder.”3 The
Japanese social structure and Confucian traditions with their non-egalitarian situational ethics
allowed the Japanese to acknowledge their subordinate rank to the United States. This
acknowledgement was that of fealty, thus the Japanese were able to subordinate themselves to
the occupation without being in violation to their self-respect or propriety.4
The revision of the Japanese constitution demonstrated MacArthur’s autonomy and
independent command of SCAP. The Japanese government had put together a constitutional
committee to revise the Meiji Constitution of 1889, yet the leadership lacked a strong
understanding of democratic ideals. The constitutional draft they submitted to SCAP
disappointed MacArthur. He was concerned because the Japanese Diet elections were fast
approaching in the spring of 1946 and MacArthur had expected that the new Japanese
constitution would be ready for the people to vote on. With the current Japanese draft the
Japanese people would be voting for a constitution that was basically the same as the old Meiji
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Constitution. Plus, MacArthur feared Soviet posturing to stall the constitutional process.
MacArthur was also concerned that the conservative Japanese leadership through stalling of their
own to change their constitution threatened themselves the Imperial institution. The importance
of the Imperial institution in the stability of Japan had already been decided and MacArthur was
not about to let Japanese conservatism impede the transformation of the government.
MacArthur gave SCAP’s government section the responsibility of writing the new
Japanese constitution. The SCAP constitutional draft was a mix of democratic, republican, and
monarchism. The government it created resembled the British parliamentary democratic system.
On March 6, MacArthur announced to the Japanese people that the Japanese government had a
constitution that was worthy of a democratic nation. On May 3, 1947, Japan would declare its
political reformation complete with the new Constitution going into effect. MacArthur achieved
this political reformation three years into the occupation.
MacArthur’s final initiative in the political transformation of Japan was the establishment
of a democratic and independent press. MacArthur started this reform early in the occupation by
issuing a number of directives designed to insure tranquility and truth in the Japanese press
reporting. Unfortunately, the reform of the press was harder than first believed. MacArthur
ordered a one hundred percent censorship of the Japanese press and any Japanese newspapers
that printed inaccurate stories were threatened with closure. Over the last few months of 1945
and into the next year, the Japanese press adjusted to the new reality of Japan. To help with the
change, SCAP offered special training sessions to teach Japanese newsmen on the workings of a
democratic press. By the end of the occupation the press was reporting on news across the nation
and on a wide spread of topics unhindered in its work to give the Japanese people the best news
it could.
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While political reconstructions was critical, MacArthur knew that economic challenges
were equally important. MacArthur and his staff designed the reconstruction of Japan’s economy
to insure sustainability and stability in the nation’s recovery. Japan was devastated by the war
and required American aid to assist its economic recovery. MacArthur saw to it that food was
distributed to meet the most pressing needs and oversaw regular food shipments over several
years. The food crisis could have derailed MacArthur’s political reforms, though he showed
great ability in balancing all his responsibilities to deliver relief to the Japanese people.
MacArthur’s instrumental initiative to reform the Japanese land system provided political
stability in rural Japan and eased the unemployment crisis. At the end of the war, the Japanese
were desperate for jobs. The occupation helped provide some employment as many Japanese
were needed to support the American presence. MacArthur sponsored a land reform initiative
that provided many more opportunities for land ownership and independent farmers, creating a
much more stable agricultural environment. With many people returning to family farms for
shelter, work, and food the rural areas became more connected to the devastation in the urban
areas. Rural Japan was having to support the urban areas more than they could bear. Land reform
relaxed political tensions amongst the rural population and by creating many independent
landowners out of a few helped the agricultural sector recover.
The program to dissolve the zaibatsu to create a more competitive free enterprise system
demonstrates the effort that American leaders exerted to model the Japanese economy after the
American economy. Even though the dissolution of the zaibatsu was discontinued by leaders in
Washington, they were reformed to allow more shareholders and a greater redistribution of the
nation’s economic wealth. The zaibatsu, though they survived the occupation, would not be as
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strong or exact the same influence they once had over the economy. Japan’s economy was
effectively democratized.
Although critical, reform and reorganization were only part of Japan’s postwar economic
recovery. Japan also needed to develop sustainable industries and that was a priority for
MacArthur. The textile industry was reestablished and provided a level of stability, especially for
unskilled workers; however, since Japan had more skilled laborers, it needed some new
industries. Cameras became one such industry and later automobiles became another. The thing
that these two industries had in common was that they only required a small amount of raw
materials to produce the products and gave a large return on the foreign market. SCAP also gave
out benefits to encourage Japanese entrepreneurs and the small business community. A small
company called Sony went into electronics and another Japanese entrepreneur started Honda
putting small motors on bicycles. Sustainable, low product material count industries were the
future of the Japanese economy.
Japan’s economic growth around sustainable industries created a new source of national
pride. Economic prosperity became the focus of the nation since the nation could invest more in
economic infrastructure with only a small defense force to maintain. “Technonationalism,” as
coined by Richard Samuels, is one way to describe the Japanese drive towards technological and
sustainable industries that make up the foundation of their economy. The Japanese economy is
centered around producing technologically advanced products or products that go inside of other
products that sell well on the international market. The key is that the industries that dominate
the Japanese economy require only a small amount of raw materials to be imported, while
exporting a large return. The Japanese economic model was the first in Asia and one that can be
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seen in other nations economies. For example, South Korea and Taiwan, who have established
themselves as Asian economic powers.
Finally, MacArthur initiated the return of Christian missions to Japan because he believed
in the combination of democracy and Christianity. MacArthur was very public about his wish
that Japan be Christianized and he used his autonomy to have SCAP support the missionary
work. MacArthur reignited Christian missions to Japan by putting out the call for missionaries
and Bibles. The response was a wave of support with 11,000,000 million Bibles being distributed
in Japan and several thousand Protestant and Catholic missionaries, coming to Japan. The
mission effort received wide support amongst American churches and MacArthur was praised
for initializing the mission work. Yet, while MacArthur and many American missionaries
believed that Japan was open to receiving and converting to Christianity, they did not take into
account several important things. First, Shintoism and Buddhism remained the spiritual and
religious leaders in Japan. Christianity was a curiosity to the Japanese and many went to the
churches because they wanted to learn about Christianity, usually not because they wanted to
convert. The Japanese church would remain a minority in Japan, despite the resources that the
Christian missions spent in Japan.
A legacy of MacArthur’s in reigniting Christian missions to Japan was in the
establishment of the International Christian University in 1949. MacArthur was a key supporter
of the university. International Christian University still exists to this day in Japan, a lasting
reminder of the Christian movement in Japan during the occupation. The school provides an
educational foundation for the Japanese church. The university stands at the pinnacle of private
Christian education in Japan amongst the other schools that were started during the occupation
with the purpose of Christianizing Japan.
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The strong relationship between the United States and Japan since World War II has its
roots in the occupation. The economic success and power of the Japanese economy had its start
with the occupation and the reforms that came with it; the Japanese government was reformed to
a parliamentary democracy focused on peace, innovation, and prosperity because of the
occupation; and the injection of democratic ideals into Japanese society gave energy to the New
Japan that helped to drive the nation forward into a new age. MacArthur, as the head of the
occupation, will always be remembered as a key leader in the transformation of Japan and its
relationship with the United States. The autonomy and authority that MacArthur wielded allowed
him to achieve all the objectives in the Potsdam Declaration and carry out reforms that though
not specified were important to Japan’s security, stability recovery. Without MacArthur the
occupation would have looked different and the current American-Japanese relationship would
not be the same.
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Koseki, Shōichi and Ray A. Moore. The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press. 1997.
Inoue, Kyoko. MacArthur's Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Study of Its
Making. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Jennings, Ray Salvatore., The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany,
and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace,
2003.
Maki, John M. Japan's Commission on the Constitution The Final Report. Ann Arbor, MI:
Seattle University of Washington Press, 2017.
Manchester, William. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1946. Boston, MA: Little,
Brown, 1978.
Masuda, Hiroshi. MacArthur in Asia: The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and
Korea. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012.
Milly, Deborah J. Poverty, Equality, and Growth: The Politics of Economic Need in Postwar
Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center. 1999.
Democracy in Contemporary Japan. Ed. By McCormack, Gavan, Yoshio Sugimoto. New York,
NY: Routledge, 1986.
Moore, Ray A. and Robinson, Donald L. Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese
State under MacArthur. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2002.
Mullins, Mark. Handbook of Christianity in Japan. Vol. 10. Bd.10. Boston, MA: Brill, 2003.
Mullins, Mark. ed. Christianity made in Japan: A Study of Indigenous Movements. Honolulu, HI:
University of Hawai'i Press, 1998.

95

Perry, John Curtis. Beneath the Eagle’s Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan. New York, NY:
Dodd, Mead, 1980.
Perry, Mark. The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur. New
York, NY: Basic Books, 2014.
Phillips, James M. From the Rising of the Sun: Christians and Society in Contemporary Japan.
Vol. no. 3. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981.
Porter, Edgar A. and Ran Ying Porter. Japanese Reflections on World War II and the American
Occupation. Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam University Press, 2017.
Roberson, John R. “Rebuilding A Nation” & “Japan A World Power.” In Japan from Shogun to
Sony, 1543-1984. 162-177 & 178-190. (New York: Atheneum, 1985).
Rogers, Katherine. “The Interagency Process In Reconstruction Of Post-World War II Japan” In
The Interagency And Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, And
Reconstruction Roles. Report. Edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs. Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2007. 171-208.
Samuels, Richard J. Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological
Transformation of Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Schaller, Michael. Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989.
Schaller, Michael. Altered States the United States and Japan Since the Occupation. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Schaefer, Peter F., P. Clayton Schaefer, and Dewey A. Browder. “Planning for Reconstruction
and Transformation of Japan after World War II” In Stability Operations And StateBuilding: Continuities And Contingencies. Report. Edited by Kaufmann Greg. Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008. 69-88.
Spalding, Elizabeth Edwards. The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the
Remaking of Liberal Internationalism. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
2007.
Seraphim, Franziska. War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Asia Center, 2006.
Schonberger, Howard B. Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952.
Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989.

96

Takemae, Eiji. The Allied Occupation of Japan. New York, NY: Continuum, 2003.
Ward, Robert E., Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai, Joint Committee on
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